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THE SPERMINATOR AS A PUBLIC NUISANCE: REDRESSING
WRONGFUL LIFE AND BIRTH CLAIMS IN NEW WAYS (A.K.A.
NEW TRICKS FOR OLD TORTS)
Barbara Pfeffer Billauer J.D., M.A., Ph.D.
Faced with an increase in sperm bank “accidents,” the lacuna of suitable legal redress for sperm bank imposed harms begs to be filled. This
article demonstrates for the first time that some sperm bank generated
harms transcend violating the personal goals of the parent and the rights
of the child. In addition, sperm bank errors infringe on societal rights by,
for example, saddling it with health costs for children born with genetic
diseases. Moreover, introducing inherited diseases into the gene pool in
large numbers sets the stage for a public health crisis. To address these
harms, I propose repurposing an old cause of action, the private claim of
a public nuisance. This harm-driven approach expands the class of
would-be plaintiffs, broadens the spectrum of allowable claims, and bypasses restrictions imposed by traditional negligence law. Insofar as punitive damages are allowed, the claim has the potential to act as a deterrent of a host of sub-par sperm bank practices. I also discuss the implications of holding the sperm bank to fiduciary standards.

*****
“Science has once again—as it always does—outstripped the law . . . the
direction from the higher courts and the Legislature is clear—perhaps a
half-step behind today’s science, but clear—and until it is changed, it
controls the outcome of this case.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Sperm banking has become a business, an international business, and a
very lucrative one at that. Driven by commercialization and profit margins, 2
and without the moral safeguards of the Hippocratic Oath that govern the
practice of medicine,3 innate moral or ethical constraints have all but dis-

1. Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *3 (Ga. Super.
Ct. Oct. 20, 2015) (opinion written by Judge Robert McBurney).
2. NAOMI CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL
REGULATION 149 (2009).
3. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal
Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 567, 591 (2011);
see also Caroline Forell and Ana Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 MICH. J.L.
REFORM 557, 586 (2009).
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solved. The results are mixed: millions of babies born who otherwise would
not have been, but with serious harm to some of them.
Marketed via commercial carriers, advertised in glossy catalogs that rival fashion and beauty magazines, freeze-dried and sold over the internet,
the “easy-come” practices and products of the sperm bank industry are the
breeding ground for abuses. Baby-making clinics (in-vitro fertilization, or
IVF, facilities) that once used standard and universally approved techniques
are “always looking for a competitive advantage,”4 sometimes using ethically questionable technologies5 such as mitochondrial DNA transfers sanctioned in Britain.6
Abuses lead to increased chances of consanguinity, destroyed gametes,
frustrated chances of reproduction and cases of babies “switched before
birth” (also known as “scrambled eggs”), with interracial babies being born
to single-race couples.7 But it gets worse: what if—horrifically enough—and
unbeknownst to the mother who took great care in sperm selection, the
sperm donor turns out to be—a criminal? Or, more horrifically, what if the
sperm supplier has an inheritable disease? And what if that disease is a psychosis?8 But it gets still worse: what if the sperm supplier has fathered a
score or more children carrying genes for that illness? These are not hypotheticals created to whet the appetite of the reader. These are current problems—the subject of current lawsuits and the subject of this article.
The problems with Assisted Reproductive Technology gone-rogue are
roundly acknowledged—as is the lack of viable legal redress.9 While Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID) has been available since the late 1700s,10
4. Michael Cook, Tandem IVF: Anything to Guarantee a Baby, BIOEDGE (Aug. 26,
2017), https://www.bioedge.org/bioethics/anything-to-guarantee-a-baby/12404.
5. Ariana Eunjung Cha, This Fertility Doctor is Pushing the Boundaries of Human
Reproduction,
with
Little
Regulation,
WASH.
POST
(May
14,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/this-fertility-doctor-is-pushing-theboundaries-of-human-reproduction-with-little-regulation/2018/05/11/ea9105dc-1831-11e88b08-027a6ccb38eb_story.html?utm_term=.434bcf2ba38b.
6. Ian Sample, First UK Baby with DNA from Three People Could Be Born Next Year,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/dec/15/three-parentembryos-regulator-gives-green-light-to-uk-clinics.
7. See ACB v. Thomson Medical PTE Ltd, [2017] SGCA 20, (Ct. App. Sing., Mar. 22,
2017) Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2015.
8. See Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1 (Ga.
Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2015).
9. Andrea Preisler, Assisted Reproductive Technology: The Dangers of an Unregulated
Market and the Need for Reform, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 213, 213 (2013)
(“[L]awmakers have been slow to address [advances in assisted reproductive technology,] . . .
[which] has left a gaping hole for a booming, unregulated market fraught with fraud and
abuse . . . [and] a lawless free-for-all where the most exploitive providers reign.”).
10. DOUGLAS J. CUSINE, NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 12
(1988).
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the number of lawsuits (as opposed to errors) is unusually small—in no
small measure due to the societal pressure to keep such procedures secret, or
because problems go undetected. This results in legal confusion, an alarming lack of precedent, and a dearth of effective legal remedies.
“Wrongful life,”11 the relevant tort with the “teeth,” might deter negligence and encourage safer practice if it weren’t generally rejected as abhorrent to judicial sentiment. Added to the policy rationale for its rejection12 is
concern that wrongful life/birth claims validate pejoration of genetically
challenged or interracial children.13 In the context of IVF, a similar concern
exists that children conceived via IVF might be seen as “lesser” than the
children conceived without technology. Sperm bank companies take advantage of these attitudes and the current judicial climate, hiding under cover of likely dismissal of lawsuits—only to run to settle the most egregious
cases where there is even a hint the claims may survive.14 Most victims,
therefore, remain uncompensated—including children suffering genetic diseases15—and society is left to pick up the tab as clear legal solutions to reproductive wrongs go wanting.16
Others have come before me to joust with problems presented by reproductive technologies.17 However, their proposed solutions have yet to
gain traction.18 Some say only increased regulation will address the problem.19 In truth, some regulations do exist. But regulations are weak, uneven,
and almost impossible to enforce. Indeed, increased regulation, although
11. The confusion between “wrongful life” and “wrongful birth” is rampant. Traditionally, wrongful life is the child’s claim for being born, and wrongful birth is the parents’ claim
for raising that child. However, courts routinely mangle the terms. See infra notes 125–129
and accompanying text. Thus, the “labels [of wrongful life and wrongful birth] are not instructive.” See Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E. 2d 8, 9 n.3 (Mass. 1990). See also Barbara
Pfeffer Billauer, Re-Birthing Wrongful Birth Claims in the Age of IVF and Abortion Reforms,
(September 19, 2019) (manuscript at 3–4) (Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456822),
50 STETSON LAW REV. (forthcoming).
12. Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Wrongful Life in the Age of Crispr-Cas, 142 PENN ST. L.
REV. (forthcoming Winter 2020).
13. See Sagit Mor, The Dialectics of Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Claims in
Israel: A Disability Critique, in 63 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 113–146 (Austin Sarat ed., 2014).
14. Rebecca Lindstrom, Sperm Bank Settles Negligence Lawsuits, 11 ALIVE, (Oct. 6,
2017), https://www.11alive.com/article/news/investigations/sperm-bank-settles-negligencelawsuits/481397639.
15. See Donovan v. Idant Laboratories, 625 F. Supp. 2d 256, 276 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
16. Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2017).
17. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 3.
18. See Michele Goodwin, A View from the Cradle: Tort Law and Private Regulation of
Assisted Reproduction, 59 EMORY L.J. 1039, 1043 (2010) (discussing these issues in the
context of harms occasioned by parental irresponsibility, as opposed to third party malfeasance, discussed here).
19. See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 2.
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perhaps helpful, would be protracted in coming and unavailable to deal with
the immediacy of the problems. Further, beefed up Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations might trigger the pre-emption doctrine which
could have a net-negative effect. Enforcement could be assigned to state
public health agencies and hence would be uneven. Furthermore, evidence
exists indicating that even where there is comprehensive regulation, such as
in the UK, errors continue to proliferate.20 And finally, the international nature of the problem means domestic regulation would be of little use to an
American who gets her sperm abroad.
One legal scholar has gone as far as proposing a new cause of action
called “reproductive negligence” as the only solution.21 This schema revolves around focusing on the negligent acts and its consequences: imposing
a pregnancy, denying a pregnancy, or confounding the choice of child. One
problem with this innovative approach is that it may not be as comprehensive as its author would have hoped or available as quickly as the severity of
the problem warrants, and some harms would still seep through the cracks of
its still-wet foundation. These include non-negligent errors which nonetheless generate serious injuries.
To address sperm bank generated damage, I take a novel approach
which makes several contributions. Firstly, I propose reframing the problem.22 Rather than focusing on the causal act or its consequences to conceptualize injury (the traditional negligence approach), I propose focusing on
the harm and assessing it according to its gravity and magnitude. This is a
public-health oriented approach23 which concentrates on prevention and
deterrence rather than punitive or restorative justice. Second, I propose a
novel use for an old tort, the private right of public nuisance,24 to address the
most serious (what I call the “greater”) harms—i.e., those that in addition to
harming an individual (parent or child) also cause harm at the population
level (e.g., by affecting the population gene pool or generating custody disputes taxing the court system). This harm-driven approach also coheres with
20. Billauer, Rebirthing, supra note 11.
21. Fox, supra note 16.
22. The framing of issues in medical/legal controversies often affects the outcome. See
Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, The Causal Conundrum: Examining Medical-Legal Disconnects
from a Cultural Perspective or How the Law Swallowed the Epidemiologist and Grew Long
Legs and a Tail, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 319, 359 (2018).
23. “Public health surveillance is used . . . to quantify the magnitude of health problems
. . . and appropriate and allocate prevention and care funds.” Lisa M. Lee et al., Ethical Justification for Conducting Public Health Surveillance without Patient Consent, AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH, Jan. 2012, at 38; see also S.B. Thacker, Historical Development, in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE 1, 1–17 (Lisa M. Lee et al. eds., 3d ed. 2010).
24. Gregory C. Keating, Nuisance as a Strict Liability Wrong, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 4 (2012)
(defining nuisance in terms of the resultant harm, rather than the conduct by a defendant
which causes the harm).
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nuisance theory.25 Significantly, this stratagem enlarges the eligible class of
plaintiffs, expands the scope of recovery, and allows for punitive damages,
thereby producing a deterrent effect in addition to providing compensatory
relief and therapeutic justice. Third, I identify twin practices of sperm banks
which contribute to population-level threats and hence are especially ripe for
regulation: unlimited sperm “donations” 26 per supplier27 coupled with anonymity of sperm suppliers,28 which foster a lack of candor on applications.
Exacerbated by failure to adequately screen/identify transmitters of heritable
diseases,29 these practices contribute to long-range population consequences
when genetic diseases are passed on to multiple offspring. Identifying this
hitherto unrecognized assault on the population gene pool is critically important in motivating society to address deficiencies in sperm bank management in a holistic fashion, using all the tools at its disposal: tort law,
medical policy, and governmental regulation.
Setting the stage for using a nuisance claim under the theory that one
who reaps a profit from an enterprise should bear the costs,30 Part II of this
article provides a historical and financial overview of the sperm bank industry. Here, I also present a panoply of sperm bank errors and identify past and
current attempts to rectify these problems. Part III defines and delineates the
25. Highview N. Apartments v. City of Ramsey, 323 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Minn. 1982);
Frank v. Envtl. Sanitation Mgmt., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Mo. 1985). In fact, the word
originally meant no more than “harm.” See W. PAGE PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS 999 n.34 (5th ed. 1984); see also Matthew Russo, Productive Public Nuisance:
How Private Individuals Can Use Public Nuisance to Achieve Environmental Objectives,
2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1969, 1978 (2018).
26. Most countries do limit the number of donations, but abuses abound. See infra pp.
19–22; see also K. Berg et al., The Diversity of Regulation and Public Financing of IVF in
Europe and Its Impact on Utilization, 28 HUM. REPROD. 666 (2013).
27. Sperm “donation” is actually a misnomer, and I am grateful for the reminder given
to me at the Health Law Professor’s Conference, Cleveland, June 2018, where I presented an
early version of the paper. Payment for sperm is delineated as compensation for time, although the financial incentive to the “sperm provider” is the driving force. I will use the term
“sperm provider” or “sperm supplier” to more accurately reflect the state of affairs.
28. Fertility Treatment in Japan, a Corked Tube: No Country Resorts More to IVF—or
Has Less Success, ECONOMIST, May 26, 2018, at 50–51; see also Tamar Lewin, Sperm Banks
Accused of Losing Samples and Lying About Donors, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/sperm-banks-accused-of-losing-samples-and-lyingabout-donors.html.
29. Sperm bank sloppiness (which involves mishandling of eggs) would be less likely to
transmit genetic errors in ova by virtue of a) the lower number of egg donations per woman,
and b) less availability of anonymity in egg donation. See Barry J. Maron, Implications of
Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy Transmitted by Sperm Donation, 302 JAMA 1681, 1681
(2009).
30. See Louise A. Halper, Public Nuisance and Public Plaintiffs: Rediscovering the
Common Law (Part I), 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 292 (1986); see also infra notes 383, 390, and
accompanying text.
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category of greater harms, illustrating the legal lacuna for redress via a case
review of four cases. In Part IV, I lay the groundwork for using the nuisance
claim in IVF and sperm bank generated cases via a case study of four more
cases, examining the population ramifications when serious diseases are
introduced into the gene pool. Part V discusses the legal background for
nuisance theory and provides the basis for its novel use in the context of the
sperm bank errors. Part VI raises anthropological aspects of the problem.
Here I raise the novel concept of saddling sperm banks with fiduciary status
as they have (for a profit) usurped the right to parent—which, I claim, includes selection of the co-parent. Thus, when the sperm bank erroneously
substitutes a different genetic package than selected, it effectively replaces
the parent of choice, frustrating this right to parental selection. This section
also sensitizes the reader to the concern about eugenics in this context.31
II. THE SPERM BANKING CRISIS
A.

A Historical and Financial Overview

Advances in Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART)32 have progressed exponentially33 in the years following the birth of Louise Brown via
31. Embryo Checks ‘Should be Widened,’ BBC NEWS (May 8, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4750341.stm (“The UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority currently allows embryos to be screened for inherited diseases such as cystic
fibrosis . . . and two inherited cancer conditions . . . familial adematous polyposis (FAP), a
type of bowel cancer, and cancer of the retina” using pre-implantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD). Following a government report recommending screening for susceptibility genes
linked to cancer, stakeholders objected: “[the] director of the group Comment on Reproductive Ethics, said: ‘PGD is currently nothing more than a weapon of destruction, aimed at the
ruthless elimination of any embryo which does not conform to eugenic concepts of perfection.’ . . . Rachel Hurst, of Disability Awareness in Action, said: ‘If you say that it’s OK to
say that you can eliminate embryos which would lead to disabled people, you’re saying that
disabled people are not people. And you’re saying that their quality of life is not worth living,
which is discriminatory and extremely prejudicial.’”).
32. Per the CDC, ART consists of all clinical treatments and laboratory procedures—
including handling human oocytes, sperm, and embryos—conducted with the intent of conceiving (e.g., IVF, gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer, sperm, oocyte, or embryo donation, and gestational surrogacy). See Implementation of the Fertility
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992—A Model Program for the Certification of
Embryo Laboratories, 64 Fed. Reg. 39,374, 39,383 (July 21, 1999).
33. The first reported human artificial insemination occurred almost two hundred years
earlier when Dr. John Hunter advised a man to fill a syringe with sperm and inject it in his
wife’s vagina immediately after intercourse. CUSINE, supra note 10, at 12–13. The first Artificial Insemination by a Donor (AID) occurred in 1866 when a physician used sperm from his
“handsomest” medical student to inseminate a patient at the behest of her husband; she became pregnant, none the wiser. Brent J. Jensen, Artificial Insemination and the Law, BYU L.
REV. 935, 938 (1982).
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IVF in 1978.34 Short-term storage of semen (in dry ice) occurred decades
earlier, in 1953. But it was the wide availability of long-term and efficient
“cryobanking” (freezing sperm in nitrogen vapor) in the late 1990s35 coupled
with IVF, and fostered by cheap internet advertising36 and electronic sperm
selection that allowed for international sales and consumption.37 These forces have propelled the ART industry to gargantuan heights:38 in the last five
years, the total number of babies born via reproductive technology skyrocketed from five million39 to eight million,40 with an increase of apparently one
34. Victoria Ward, Louise Brown, the First IVF Baby, Reveals Family was Bombarded
with Hate Mail, TELEGRAPH (July 24, 2015, 9:55 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
health/11760004/Louise-Brown-the-first-IVF-baby-reveals-family-was-bombarded-withhate-mail.html.
35. “By 1963, liquid nitrogen was introduced as a method of long-term sperm cryopreservation, which allowed sperm freezing to become widespread . . . even after 40 years of
cryopreservation. However, liquid nitrogen confers a risk of viral cross-contamination with
other sperm samples in the same container. Consequently, most modern sperm storage banks
utilize nitrogen vapor . . . .” Hamoun Rozati et al., Process and Pitfalls of Sperm Cryopreservation 6 (9) J. CLIN MED. at 89 (Sept. 2017).
36. “Prospective parents can search for everything about a donor—from his profession
to his hair color—using a bank’s online donor catalogue.” How to Buy and Sell Sperm,
(“Choose your guy, call the bank and order your sperm. Have it shipped directly to your
doctor’s office or to your home if your partner or midwife will be doing the honors.”) (on file
with author); See also Rusty Dornin, Surfing for Sperm, Reproduction in Cyberspace, CNN
(July 24, 1998), http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9807/24/cyber.sperm/; Mary Crane, The
Business of Love, Sperm for Sale, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2007), https://www.cryobank.com/_
resources/pdf/news/sperm-for-sale.pdf. See e.g., Donor Selection, CALIFORNIA CRYOBANK,
https://www.cryobank.com/why-use-us/donor-selection/ (last visited September 29, 2019);
Why Choose Cryos, CRYOS, https://usa.cryosinternational.com/about/why-choose-cryos (last
visited September 29, 2019), and Quality Assurance, FAIRFAX CRYOBANK
https://fairfaxcryobank.com/quality-assurance (last visited September 29, 2019).
37. Mark S. Frankel, Cryobanking of Human Sperm, 1 J. ED. ETHICS, at 36 (1975).
38. An Embryonic Idea: Carrot, a Silicon Valley startup, Takes a Novel Approach to
Funding IVF, ECONOMIST (June 30, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-andeconomics/2018/06/28/carrot-a-silicon-valley-startup-takes-a-novel-approach-to-funding-ivf
(noting 71,000 babies were born by IVF in America, tripled from two decades earlier and
comprising 1.8 percent of all births. In Denmark, Israel, and Spain, babies born by IVF comprise as high as 4 percent of all births, possibly due to better insurance coverage); see also
Yaniv Heled, The Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive Tissue—The Need
for Federal Regulation, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 243 (2010), http://stlr.org/volumes/
volume-xi-2009-2010/heled/.
39. Michelle Castillo, Report: 5 Million Babies Born Thanks to Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, CBS NEWS (Oct. 15, 2013, 12:08 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/report5-million-babies-born-thanks-to-assisted-reproductive-technologies/; see A. P. Ferraretti et
al., Assisted Reproductive Technology in Europe, 2012: Results Generated from European
Registers by ESHRE, 8 HUM. REPROD. 1638 (2016); see also Victoria Clay Wright, Assisted
Reproductive Technology Surveillance—United States, 2003, 55 MMWR No. 22-4, CDC
(May 26, 2006), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5504a1.htm.
40. See Press Release, European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology,
More Than 8 Million Babies Born from IVF Since the World’s First in 1978 (July 3, 2018),
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million in the last year alone.41 In addition, some one million embryos are
estimated to reside in storage in some five hundred sperm banks in the United States. Some tech companies, such as Facebook and Google, even offer
IVF as an employee benefit.42
Technological advances add to the baby-making calculus, catapulting
the fertility industry into a ten-billion-dollar business in 201743 (some estimates put it as high as seventeen billion dollars),44 up from three billion in
200945 and projected to reach thirty billion in five years.46 Some figures have
global sales projected even higher: “[b]y 2026 the global fertility industry
could rake in US $41 billion in sales, from $25 billion today. Today one in
sixty Americans is born thanks to IVF and other artificial treatments. In
Denmark, Israel and Japan the figure is more than one in twenty-five—and
rising . . . .”47 Notwithstanding limited insurance coverage48—at least in the
United States49—excessive demand by people desperate for a baby (a vulnerable market) continues. Another market lies in catering to those seeking
“designer children”50 or those merely wanting children to look like them

https://www.eshre.eu/Annual-Meeting/Barcelona-2018/ESHRE-2018-Press-releases/DeGeyter.
41. Cha, supra note 5, (claiming seven million babies have been born via IVF and related technologies).
42. Lisa M. Krieger, Fertility Center Failures – Would Oversight Help? Technology
Failures
at
Fertility
Clinics,
MERCURY
NEWS
(Mar.
12,
2018),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/03/12/fertility-center-failures-would-oversight-help/.
43. The Global IVF Services Market - by Cycle Type, End User, Region - Market Size,
Demand Forecasts, Company Profiles, Industry Trends and Updates (2017-2023), MARKET
INSIDER, Sept. 10, 2018 [hereinafter Global IVF Services Market 2017-2023] (“The Global
IVF Services Market Was Worth 10.58 Billion USD in 2017.”).
44. Ariana Eunjung Cha, How Religion Is Coming to Terms with Modern Fertility
Methods, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/
national/how-religion-is-coming-to-terms-with-modern-fertility-methods/.
45. CAHN, supra note 2.
46. The Fertility Market Is Projected to Reach Over $30 Billion by 2023,
MARKETWATCH (May 29, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/video/sectorwatch/thefertility-market-is-projected-to-reach-over-30-billion-by-2023/CEE9BE6F-E411-4666-9E815472C9BA34BF.html; but see Global IVF Services Market 2017-2023, supra note 43.
(claiming “The Global IVF Services Market . . . is estimated to grow to 18.55 Billion USD by
2023.”); see also K. Berg et al., The Diversity of Regulation and Public Financing of IVF in
Europe and Its Impact on Utilization, 28 HUM. REPROD. 666 (2013).
47. Michael Cook, Fertility Becomes a Global Money-Spinner, The Economist Analyses
the Market, BIOEDGE (Aug 18, 2019).
48. See JUDITH DAAR, THE NEW EUGENICS: SELECTIVE BREEDING IN AN ERA OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (2017).
49. I’m Ready for IVF: What Will My Health Insurance Pay For?, WINFERTILITY,
https://www.winfertility.com/insurance-coverage-for-infertility/ (last visited June 13, 2019).
50. Ariana Eunjung Cha, Discounts, Guarantees and the Search for ‘Good’ Genes: The
Booming Fertility Business, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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(one of the oldest parental urges51). Today prospective parents can search for
everything about a donor (except his identity), from his profession to his
hair color, using a bank’s online donor catalogue.52
High profit margins and greed surely drive lobbying efforts to preserve
the “hands-off” approach of government regulation in some countries, like
the United States, where regulations are few and enforcement all but nonexistent.53 In fact, the sperm banking profit margin (reportedly as high as 83
percent, with a 2000 percent markup)54 would be considered usurious if well
known. Moreover, the “high operating margins—around 30% in America
for a $20,000 round of IVF—plus the recession-proof nature of desire for
offspring,” are features which excite investors.55
B.

A Panoply of Problems

Too rapid expansion of an unregulated business always brings problems56—in this case errors and accidents.57 Given that the primary motivation is profit rather than healthcare, the baby-making industry is, not surprisingly, responsible for more than its fair share. In fact, problems in IVF have

national/health-science/donor-eggs-sperm-banks-and-the-quest-for-good-genes/2017/10/21/
64b9bdd0-aaa6-11e7-b3aa-c0e2e1d41e38_story.html.
51. Jacob supposedly favored Joseph because of the strong physical resemblance. See
Edward L. Greenstein, Medieval Bible Commentaries, in BACK TO THE SOURCES 215, 230
(Barry W. Holtz ed., 2008) (quoting Onkelos).
52. See Lisa Jean Moore & Marianna Grady, Putting ‘Daddy’ in the Cart: Ordering
Sperm Online, in REFRAMING REPRODUCTION 185 (M. Nash ed., 2014).
53. While a license is required by the California Department of Public Health, it requires
only names of employees, a list of tissue types stored and a written copy of policies and procedures. See Krieger, supra note 42.
54. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE
THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 37 n.17, 38 n.20 (2006).
55. Cook, supra note 47.
56. SPAR, supra note 54, at 2–6.
57. See Susannah Baruch et al., Genetic Testing of Embryos: Practices and Perspectives
of U.S. In Vitro Fertilization Clinics, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1053, 1055 (2008) (noting
“21% of IVF-PGD clinics report that they have been aware of inconsistencies between the
results of genetic analysis of embryos and later genetic testing”); see also Hebert v. Ochsner
Fertility Clinic, 102 So. 3d 913, 915 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing “inadequate control and
supervision of [fertility clinic] procedures”); SHARON T. MORTIMER & DAVID MORTIMER,
QUALITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE IVF LABORATORY 40–44 (2d ed. 2015) (detailing
risk factors like inadequate staffing and training, equipment and power failures, and shoddy
labeling, documentation, and incident reporting that make adverse reproductive outcomes
more likely); Fox, supra note 16, at 152 n.8 (“lamenting that ‘only very few ART laboratories . . . have implemented a quality system’ to minimize errors involving lost embryos or
switched samples . . . .”) (citing J.P.W. Vermeiden, Laboratory-Related Risks in Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, in ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: QUALITY AND
SAFETY 127, 128–29 (Jan Gerris et al. eds., 2004)).
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“increased more than fourfold since 2008.”58 Among clinics reporting errors,
one in five reported errors in labelling, diagnosing, handling donor samples
and embryos for implantation.59
Aggressive recruitment of sperm suppliers further compounds the problems,60 especially as the come-on is often in-your-face financial inducements. For example, an online ad by Xytex Corporation for sperm suppliers
(now removed from the internet) reads:
Image 1. A now-removed ad soliciting sperm donations.61

Problems range from lost or destroyed gametes, to depriving would-be
parents from a chance to procreate,62 to multiple embryos destroyed or lost,63
58. HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., STATE OF THE FERTILITY SECTOR:
2016–17, at 24–26 (2017), https://www.hfea.gov.uk/media/2437/hfea_state_of_the_sector_
report_tagged.pdf.
59. Baruch et al., supra note 57.
60. E.g., International Cryogenics of Michigan pays their suppliers “$45 for each sample” . . . “the samples are then subdivided, averaging three vials of 20 million motile sperm
apiece, with each vial selling for $200 to $250,” making the total sales profit per “donation”
about $700. See Denise Grady, As the Use of Donor Sperm Increases, Secrecy Can Be a
Health Hazard, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, at F8, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/06/
health/06opin.html. An internet comment by a sperm supplier is telling: “If you want to be a
donor, you need to be tall, strong, fit for breeding and an exemplary model of traditional
success. Blue-eyed, spaghetti-loving brain surgeons who are somehow six-foot-four and free
at noon on a Thursday—that’s the archetype. The reality is, most donors are young men with
flexible hours who could use the cash. Like me.” Adam Shadows, What It’s Like to Donate
Sperm to a Sperm Bank, ELITE DAILY (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.elitedaily.com/life/idonated-sperm-bank/1860397.
61. Becoming a Donor, XYTEX, https://www.xytexdonor.com/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2017) (Content of screenshot taken Feb. 2017 by author. No longer available).
62. Amy Goldstein, Fertility Clinic Informs Hundreds of Patients Their Eggs May Have
Been Damaged, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/fertility-clinic-informs-hundreds-of-patients-their-eggs-may-be-damaged/
2018/03/11/b605ea82-2536-11e8-b79d-f3d931db7f68_story.html (In March of this year, a
“long-established San Francisco fertility clinic experienced a liquid nitrogen failure in a stor-
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to switched embryos implanted in the wrong mothers,64 all on a systemic
basis.65 Other harms occur when banks implant the wrong sperm into individual recipients.66 Generally, these errors are only detected where the
mother and selected sperm donor are of different racial or ethnic varieties,67
as in the case of Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank.68 Hence, it is likely that
hundreds or perhaps thousands of instances of “switched at the test tube”
babies go undetected. Whether the birth of a biracial child can be said as a
matter of public policy to constitute damage or harm may be subject to cultural interpretation, whether ongoing sperm bank sloppiness that facilitates
these mix-ups should be tolerated, is not.
We also have cases of switched embryos. Here, the rights of biological
and birthing parents can collide with those of the child69 and we are presented with a Solomonic question of whose baby is it? These claims cause inage tank hold thousands of frozen eggs and embryos.”); see also Lisa Krieger, Lawsuit Filed
Over Lost Eggs at San Francisco Fertility Clinic, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/03/13/lawsuit-filed-over-lost-eggs-at-san-franciscofertility-clinic/; Catherine Ho, San Francisco Woman Sues Fertility Center after Frozen Eggs
Destroyed, S. F. CHRON. (Mar. 14, 2018, 3:45 PM) https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/
article/San-Francisco-woman-sues-fertility-center-after-12752957.php?psid=9ubTP (discussing S.M. v. Pac. Fertility Ctr., No. 3:18-cv-01586 (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 13, 2018) wherein
some four hundred individuals filed suit in the U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, San Francisco Division).
63. Ginger Christ & Julie Washington, UH Fertility Clinic’s Incident: What We Know,
What We Still Don’t, CLEVELAND (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.cleveland.com/healthfit/2018/
03/uh_fertility_clinics_incident.html (stating that “2,000 eggs and embryos . . . may have
been damaged or destroyed” from freezer coolant leaks); see Michan Vaughn et al., Liability
for Mismanagement of Sperm Specimens in Fertility Practices, FERTILITY AND STERILITY
(Jan. 2015), https://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282(14)02220-1/fulltext; see also Doe
v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 19 N.E.3d 178, 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); Yearworth v. N. Bristol NHS
Trust, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 37. Other incidents have been anecdotally reported to the author.
64. “Dozens of women may have had eggs fertilised [sic] by sperm cells from someone
other than the intended father, say Dutch authorities.” Agence France-Presee, IVF Mix-up:
Wrong Sperm May Have Fertilised Eggs of 26 Women, GUARDIAN, (Dec. 27, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/dec/28/ivf-mix-up-wrong-sperm-may-havefertilised-eggs-of-26-women.
65. Georgia Everett, Sperm Mix-up Involving 26 Women at Dutch IVF Clinic, BIONEWS
(Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_95838.
66. Suzanne Lenon & Danielle Peers, ‘Wrongful’ Inheritance: Race, Disability and
Sexuality in Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, 25 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 141 (2017); but
see Robert Leckey, Suing on the Shoulders of Others, JOTWELL (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://equality.jotwell.com/suing-on-the-shoulders-of-others/.
67. Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (where a white couple gave birth to biracial child).
68. Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, LLC, No. 2–16–0694, 2017 WL 2800062, ¶ 5
(Ill. App. Ct. June 27, 2017).
69. Robert Verkaik, Biological Father ‘Wins’ in IVF Mix-up Case, INDEPENDENT (Feb.
27, 2003), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/biological-father-wins-in-ivf-mixup-case-120574.html.
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tense emotional disturbances for the parents and the child, often presented in
gut-wrenching custody battles.70 Such situations have been reported in at
least fourteen locations around the world.71 In one case, the fertility specialist hid the fact that a mother was given the wrong embryo until the baby was
ten months old.72 In a classic example of shutting the barn door after the
horse escaped, the American Society of Reproductive Medicine later issued
the startling advice that fertility clinics have an ethical obligation to immediately disclose mistakes that could result in babies born with a “different
genetic parentage than intended.”73 I could find no report of legal action by
the parents (although the doctor’s license was suspended).74
In Perry-Rogers v. Fasano,75 the embryo belonging to Deborah PerryRogers and her husband, Richard, was negligently implanted in the uterus of
Donna Fasano. Fasano, who had consulted the same IVF facility, ultimately
gave birth to two children, her biological child, a white boy named Vincent,
and the biological child of the Rogers, a black boy she named Joseph. Both
couples were notified one month after the error was discovered, but the Fasanos obstructed access to Joseph by his biological parents. In July of 1999
(seven months after the child was born) the Rogers were given custody, but
in January 2000 the court granted the Fasanos visitation every other weekend. Both parties appealed. Further custody proceedings ensued during
70. Id. See also M. Spriggs, IVF Mixup: White Couple Have Black Babies, 29 J. MED.
ETHICS 65 (2003) (“Under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, a woman who
has a child born through IVF, even if it is not genetically hers, is the ‘legal mother.’ Paternity,
however, is ‘open to legal interpretation.’”).
71. See Sharon Kirkey, Switched Embryos and Wrong Sperm: IVF Mix-ups Lead to
Babies Born With ‘Unintended Parentage’, NAT’L POST (July 31, 2016, 9:42 AM),
https://nationalpost.com/health/ivf-mix-ups-lead-to-babies-born-with-unintended-parentage.
72. See Maggie O’Farrell, IVF Mother: ‘I Love Him to Bits. But He’s Probably Not
Mine’, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/oct/
30/ivf-errors-baby-mix-up); see also Creed v. United Hosp., 600 N.Y.S.2d 151, 151–52
(App. Div. 1993); Complaint at 4–5, Walterspiel v. Jain, No. BC467123 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 17, 2011), 2011 WL 3808662; Mike Celizic, Genetic Parents of Embryo Felt ‘Powerless’, TODAY (Sept. 23, 2009), https://www.today.com/health/genetic-parents-embryo-feltpowerless-1C9404873; Woman Awarded $1 Million in Embryo Mix-up, NBC NEWS (Aug. 4,
2004),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5603277/ns/health-womens_health/t/woman-awardedmillion-embryo-mix-up/#.XRKTnS2ZO5E. But see Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 282 A.D.2d
231 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), where the parents did sue the doctors in a similar situation. The
suit was apparently settled.
73. Kirkey, supra note 71.
74. See Katherine Seligman, License Revoked for Embryo Mix-up, SFGATE (Mar. 31,
2005, 4:00 AM), https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/SAN-FRANCISCO-Licenserevoked-for-embryo-mix-up-2689103.php (“Medical Board of California has revoked the
license of a prominent San Francisco fertility specialist because of his role in an embryo mixup that is still being played out in a child custody battle . . . . The board’s action, [the doctor
said], was ‘a catastrophe for him and his family.’”).
75. Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 276 A.D.2d 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
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which time the child was shuttled back and forth between both claimants,
undoubtedly leading to confusion and emotional angst. On October 26,
2000, when the child was almost two the case was finally decided, and the
child’s contact with the Fasanos (and his foster brother, Vincent) was severed.76 No discussion is made about harm caused to the child other than noting the decision was not based on the “best interests of the child” but rather
parental rights.77 A malpractice action for limited emotional distress was
allowed against the doctors.78 But illustrating the void in government oversight, “a Health Department spokeswoman said that punitive action against
Dr. Obasaju was unlikely because the state does not license or certify embryologists.”79
Custody battles aside, these switched embryo situations present a worse
harm than switched sperm cases.80 In the case of switched sperm, at least the
offspring is guaranteed a biological affinity with its mother. In switched
embryo cases, the child bears no biological connection with either parent.
Indeed, these situations call into question the entire notion of parentage.81
But by far the worst problems are those where children carry a genetic
anomaly as a result of the actions of the IVF facility or sperm bank.82

76. In Britain, the opposite result would have transpired, as the gestational mother is
considered the legal mother, regardless of genetic affinity. See Spriggs, supra note 70. This
leads to the interesting conflict of laws/comity question: If a British woman has IVF with the
egg of an American woman, whose baby is it? In Britain, it would be the British woman; in
America, the American’s. If the American woman births the child of a British embryo, in
American the child is British; in Britain, it is American.
77. Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D.2d at 67.
78. Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 282 A.D.2d 231 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (which was apparently settled).
79. Jim Yardley, Birth Mix-Up Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 1999),
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/17/nyregion/birth-mix-up-avoidable-inquiry-finds.html.
80. See Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D. 2d at 74–75.
81. Raizel Liebler, Are You My Parent? Are You My Child? The Role of Genetics and
Race in Defining Relationships After Reproductive Technological Mistakes, 5 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L., 15, 17 (2002) (“I argue that parenting is more than a genetic connection to
a child, yet should be a starting point for determining parenthood, considering the emotional
consequences. . . .”).
82. See e.g., Johnson v. Sup. Ct. of L.A. Cty., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 868 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000).
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Solutions Found Wanting
1.

Regulation

More than a decade ago, Professor Yaniv Heled wrote a prescient piece
documenting the dangers incident to lack of regulation of the industry.83
Professor Heled illustrated his premise by noting consequences of transmittal of genetic diseases such as cystic fibrosis to individual children and proposed federal regulation as the solution. Others agree.84 Professor Dov Fox,
in an aside, asserts that “regulation would be better [than any private tort
claim, as] tort law gets activated after the wrong; [but the] political climate
and economics of the industry make robust regulation and enforcement a
long shot.”85 Certainly, if Professor Heled’s legislative suggestions were
implemented when they were first raised, or at least heeded as a clarion call
to provide other solutions, the situation now would not be as dire as the evidence indicates.86
One expert blamed the American problems on a lack of a “statutory national body, such as Australia’s Reproductive Technology Accreditation
Committee or England’s Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority.”87
If doable, federal regulations could be an adjuvant to fixing the problems,
but they would not solve them all. Indeed, where regulation is in place, multiple errors still occur. For example, the United Kingdom’s comprehensive
regulatory system (the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990),
along with a centralized oversight bureau, has existed for decades.88 Nevertheless, in 2010, “some 564 serious errors occurred in British IVF centers

83. See Heled, supra note 38.
84. CAHN, supra note 2; see also Alexander N. Hecht, The Wild West: Inadequate Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 227, 238 (2001);
Karen N. Ginsburg, FDA Approved? A Critique of the Artificial Insemination Industry in the
United States, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 823, 832 (1997) (arguing federal statutes are the only
way to consistently regulate aspects of sperm donorship).
85. Fox, supra note 16, at 209.
86. IVF Errors, IMT INT’L., http://www.imtinternational.com/errors-ivf/ (last visited
Oct. 8, 2018) (“We have a tally of some of the most well-known catastrophic mistakes from
the last decade. Each resulted in complex litigation, financial expense, and reputational damage, as well as the emotional and ethical consequences. But we also know that these are likely
to be only the tip of the iceberg.”).
87. Global IVF Services Market 2017-2023, supra note 43 (per Dr. G. David Adamson,
Director of Palo Alto Medical Foundation’s Fertility Physicians of Northern California).
88. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990, c. 37 (UK)
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/37/introduction?view=extent; DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, REVIEW OF THE HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY ACT, 2006, (UK)
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/272391/6989.pdf.
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[alone] . . . more than ten every week.”89 More than 1,600 incidents were
reported between 2010 and 2012 alone.90 In 2014 the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) reported adverse incidents at a
frequency of one per every one hundred cycles of treatment,91 similar to
error rates in U.S. facilities.92 According to the global IVF Mistake Log list
by IMT Matcher, an international IVF monitoring and management firm, no
less than twelve IVF incidents (sometimes affecting multiple births) were
reported in the UK in the last two decades.93 By comparison, the same survey reported four American incidents.94 Further, British case law is ample,95
reflecting multitudinous sperm bank accidents. Of course, with regulation
comes better reporting, and it is difficult to determine if the manifold errors
reported in the UK are due to lax practice or better reporting.
Late-breaking reports however, suggest that the increase in problems is not an artifact of better reporting or additional inspections, but something else. According to a recent (and misleadingly titled) report in BioNews
the number of non-compliances per inspection decreased every year since
2015–16, but the number of errors and safety incidents rose by 18 percent.
Errors and incidents had increased by 6 percent in the last year, alone. Since
it is hardly likely that over the past year sperm banks instituted more enhanced reporting standards, something else must be at play.96

89. Sophie Borland, IVF Clinic Blunders Treble in Three Years as Ten Mistakes Every
Week Bring Heartbreak to Couples, DAILY MAIL, (Aug. 12, 2011),
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-2025501/IVF-clinic-blunders-10-mistakes-weekbring-heartbreak-couples.html; see also SPAR, supra note 54.
90. Kirkey, supra note 71.
91. IVF Blunders Result in Child Born from Wrong Sperm, TELEGRAPH (July 8, 2014),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/10952501/IVF-blunders-result-in-child-bornfrom-wrong-sperm.html; see also SPAR, supra note 54, at 3, 38, n.9.
92. Cf. Fox, supra note 16, at 152.
93. IMT International, IVF Management Technologies, reported that in May of 2018
alone there were three serious IVF errors. IVF Errors, supra note 86; see also IVF Blunders,
Mistakes or Errors – Just Not Rare, IN-FERTILITY BLOG (Jan. 8, 2017), http://infertility.eu/2017/01/08/ivf-blunders [hereinafter IVF Blunders].
94. Id.
95. See ACB v. Thomson Med. PTE Ltd, [2017] SGCA 20, (Ct. App. Sing., Mar. 22,
2017) Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2015.
96. Laura Riggali, Fertility Treatment Is Becoming Safer Says HFEA Report, BIONEWS
(Oct. 7, 2019) https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_145367.
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Chart 1: High-Profile Examples of Sperm Bank Errors.97
Some High-Profile Catastrophic Examples
Location
Year
Description & Cause
Broadway Fertility
Five women received wrong sperm in four
Clinic, Ottawa,
2007 incidents between 1986–2007. Doctor unsure
Can.
how the mistakes occurred.
Couple’s last remaining frozen embryo given
IVF Wales, UK
2007
to another woman (terminated).
Three couples had wrong sperm injected into
eggs, discovered before transfer and destroyed. Due to wrong labeling, working with
Guy’s & St. Thom2009 multiple samples in the same workstation,
as’ Hospital, UK
plus employee thawing embryos wrote on a
Post-It note and put it on the wrong paper
records.
Woman had wrong baby due to being wrong
Ohio, US
2009 thawed embryo. Employee had wrongly written a date of birth as 1967 not 1969 on label.
Two frozen embryos belonging to one woman
were lost that had been there in 2007. Note on
Ramsgate IVF, UK 2009
file read “thawed”, no evidence if transferred
or destroyed.
Woman had wrong baby due to use of wrong
Thomson Medical
sperm after lapses in procedure and human
2010
Centre, Singapore
error. No double checks, plus pipettes reused
for the “same” labelled patient.
New Zealand couple went to Thailand to have
Chiang Mai Ram
IVF using a surrogate and egg donor, but
Hospital/Kullapat
DNA test showed it had no genetic connection
2010
Medical Poly Clinto either the husband or egg donor. Whereaic, Thailand
bouts of the intended genetic material remain
unknown
Couple told that clinic had lost their frozen
IVF Wales, UK
2010
embryos just before due to implant it.
Woman given two embryos belonging to anVictory ART Lab.,
other couple. Embryologist did not correctly
2011
Hong Kong
read label before transfer and no double-check
performed.
97

IVF Mistakes Log, IMT INT’L. (Jan. 30, 2017) (on file with author and editor).
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In actuality, sperm banks are regulated in the United States, at least to a
certain extent,98 under the authority of the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) and the FDA.99 The CDC’s prime focus is determining success
rates,100 while the FDA is charged with regulating procedural aspects. In
practice, the FDA confines its oversight to monitoring screening for ten infectious diseases.101 One possible approach to protecting sperm bank consumers is expanding policy directives at the FDA. However, enacting and
implementing regulations would be a protracted process, even assuming the
legislature could reach an agreement. Another issue is the risk of tort preemption.102 We need to ask ourselves: do we trust the federal government to
have the expertise and personnel to adequately carry the job through?
Blanket focus on the need to regulate also blinds us as to what to regulate: which specific regulations actually prevent harm? One commentator
suggested better labelling requirements, including bar-code technology.103
This might help. On the other hand, a visit to an IVF clinic or a careful review of IVF mistake reports indicates it won’t be enough. Errors occur because of sloppy housekeeping, reckless performance, and failure to adhere
to internal quality control and assurance checks. Specifically, at least two
incidents occurred from improperly cleaning the pipettes used to deposit
sperm into culture media.104 Better labelling technology would do nothing to
rectify these problems.105
98. Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 201 (2001); see also J. Brad Reich &
Dawn Swink, You Can’t Put the Genie Back in the Bottle: Potential Rights and Obligations
of Egg Donors in the Cyberprocreation Era, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 23–24 (2010).
99. Alexandra Elizabeth Kilduff, The Birth of a Tort Liability Theory? Legal Remedies
for Families of Children Who Inherit Diseases from Gamete Donors, SETON HALL UNIV.
(May 1, 2014), https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/504/?utm_source=scholarship
.shu.edu%2Fstudent_scholarship%2F504&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverP
ages.
100. The U.S. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 requires fertility
clinics and ART practitioners to report to the CDC its yearly success rate. Pub. L. No. 102493, 106 Stat. 3146.
101. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75 (2004); 21 C.F.R. § 1271.80 (2004). HIV types 1 & 2, Hepatitis
B & C, Treponema pallidum; Human T-lymphotropic virus: type 1 & 2; Chlamydia trachomatis and Neisseria gonorrhea and Cytomegalovirus; 21 C.F.R. § 1271.85 (a)–(c) (2009). But
see Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Michael J. Joyce & Donna
Toohey, FDA’s Tissue Action Plan: Safeguarding the Public, AM. ACAD. ORTHOPEDIC
SURGEONS (Oct. 2004), http://www2.aaos.org/bulletin/oct04/fline6.htm.
102. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
103. See Fox, supra note 16, at 213 (“One straightforward idea is labeling sperm, eggs,
and embryos with barcodes to prevent mix-ups.”) (citing Sergi Novo et al., Barcode Tagging
of Human Oocytes and Embryos to Prevent Mix-ups in Assisted Reproduction Technologies,
29 HUM. REPROD. 18 (2014)).
104. See Kirkey, supra note 71.
105. Judith Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34
HOUS. L.R. 609 (1997) (noting that “industry self-regulation coupled with market forces
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Even with adequate regulations, regulation is useless without enforcement. Since many labs are generally accredited per state regulations,106 state
enforcement would be crucial to any viable regulatory scheme. But legislation and enforcement by states would be uneven. For example, only two
states currently have specific genetic screening regulations, New York107
and Ohio.108 And although four states (Massachusetts, Florida, Connecticut
and Michigan) trace birth defects and cancer registries of resultant offspring,109 the rest have no regulations relating to genetic diseases. Further,
notwithstanding New York’s regulations, two of the four cases resulting in
greater harms (discussed below) arose in New York.110
Another option is private regulation, a practice recently undertaken by
various religious groups111 and commercial entities. Under the concept that
another pair of eyes and oversight presence can only help to mitigate errors,
such oversight bodies can be a boon. And, although many commentators
agree regulation is warranted, as pointedly articulated by Professor Naomi
Cahn,112 regulations are often predicated on local ethical, moral,113 or culturally-driven sensitivities—such as who is eligible to provide and receive
driven by more informed and empowered consumers will do more good than any additional
government regulation.”).
106. See Naomi Cahn, When Fertility Clinics get it Wrong, FORBES, Aug. 8, 2019; but see
42 U.S.C. § 263(a)(2) (regarding “supervision or control over the practice of medicine in
assisted reproductive technology programs” which may apply only to certification programs
developed through the CDC and not the FDA).
107. New York requires a detailed medical history for “major genetic disorders” and
requires donors whose history indicates family or personal history of Tay-Sachs disease,
thalassemia, cystic fibrosis and/or sickle cell anemia to be tested for those diseases. N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS, tit. 10 § 52-8.5(b)(2); 52-8.6(h) (LexisNexis 2000).
108. Ohio law requires medical personnel to take a complete medical history of the donor, including, but not limited to, “any available genetic history of the donor.” OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3111.91(B)(1)(a) (West 2013).
109. States Monitoring Assisted Reproductive Technology Collaborative, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/art/smart/index.html (last reviewed
May 7, 2019); see also Baruch et al., supra note 57; CAHN, supra note 2.
110. See infra notes 161–168 and accompanying text.
111. See Cha, supra note 44.
112. “Few laws in the United States are directly concerned with assisted reproductive
technology. As an increasing number of people use fertility services, the industry has outpaced regulation. There is clearly a need for additional governmental oversight,” according to
Naomi Cahn, Professor of Law at The George Washington University Law School, quoted in
U.S. Fertility Center Regulation Crisis, PFEIFFER, WOLF, CARR & KANE (Oct. 20, 2019),
https://prwlegal.com/practice-areas/regulatory-crisis/. See also CAHN, supra note 2, at 140.
113. Israeli regulations focus on preventing incest, are silent on regulating sperm bank
practices, assure anonymity of the sperm donor, and allow the sperm bank doctor the final
say on sperm selection, a feature that would shield the facility from liability if the wrong
sperm were implanted. See Toi Staff, Hospital Accidentally Implants Woman with Wrong
Fertilized Egg, TIMES OF ISR. (Jan. 27, 2017, 3:24 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com
/hospital-accidentally-implants-woman-with-wrong-fertilized-egg/.
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sperm—and may not lend themselves to universal acceptance. Thus, while
regulation is likely to be an adjuvant to treating the problem, it is unlikely to
cure it completely.
In the decade following Professor Heled’s article, the potential horrors
of sperm bank practices have entered the realm of reality—not just in the
United States, but globally. With the advent of international crosspollination of sperm sales, American domestic regulation would have little
impact on the sale of American sperm abroad or insemination of American
women in reproductive-tourism havens such as Turkey114 or Israel, where
the Ministry of Health has proposed a sperm bank bill that gives prospective
parents no protection from negligence on the part of sperm banks and, in
fact, shields the physician from liability.115 Nor would regulating American
facilities address global legal discord, such as whether the child has the right
to know his or her genetic identity, or reconcile different screening and testing practices and policies around the world.116
International variation in allowable donations is a case in point. Hong
Kong limits suppliers to fathering three children;117 Israel has proposed legislation that similarly will limit donations to three offspring;118 and the Netherlands supposedly limits donors to twenty-five children.119 In 1990, The
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act in Great Britain limited the number of families created by a sperm (or egg) donor to ten families,120 although

114. See M. Said Yildiz & M. Mahmud Khan, Opportunities for Reproductive Tourism:
Cost and Quality Advantages of Turkey in the Provision of In-Vitro Fertilization (IVF) Services, BMC HEALTH SERV. RES., Aug. 2016, at 1, 4.
115. See proposed Israeli Sperm Bank bill [hereinafter Proposed Israeli Sperm Bill];
Sperm Donations, MINISTRY OF HEALTH ISR., https://www.health.gov.il/English/Topics/
fertility/Pages/sperm-bank.aspx (last visited July 5, 2019).
116. See Marcus Lütticke, No Anonymity for Sperm Donors, Court Rules, DW, July 2,
2013, http://dw.de/no-anonymity-for-sperm-donors-court -rules/a-16582786.
117. What is “Sperm Donor Treatment” Programme?, IVFHK CHINESE UNIV. OF HONG
KONG, https://www.ivfhk.com/treatments/special-services/gamete/sperm-donor (last visited
July 5, 2019).
118. Proposed Israeli Sperm Bill, supra note 115.
119. A “limit of 25 offspring has been in effect since 1992 and is designed to keep levels
of consanguinity among donor-conceived people similar to that in the overall population.
When a donor’s genetic material is present in a large number of offspring, the (very small)
risk that two half-siblings might form an intimate relationship is increased.” Jennifer Willows, Dutch Sperm Donor May Have Fathered 102 Children, UK BIONEWS, (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_96146. Recent reports indicate that the regulation may be
honored in its breach. See Grady, supra note 60; Cook, infra note 213.
120. Rebecca Smith, British Man ‘Fathered 600 Children’ at Own Fertility Clinic,
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 8, 2012, 9:38 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9193014/Britishman-fathered-600-children-at-own-fertility-clinic.html.
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enforcement is clearly lax.121 China’s policy allows for the fewest number of
pregnancies per supplier, limiting use of a supplier’s sperm to impregnating
no more than five women.122 By comparison in the United States there are
no regulations. However, an advisory by the American Society of Reproductive Medicine recommends individual suppliers be limited to providing
sperm for twenty-five donations per a population of 800,000.123 But even
this is merely a non-enforceable recommendation, and, as we will see below, abuses abound.
2.

Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Claims
a.

An overview of cases involving physician negligence

It is becoming clear that regulations do not work even where they do
exist. Another potential method of legal redress is tort law.124 Once upon a
time, tort law acted as a private attorney general125 and punitive damages
were effective deterrents.126
Most lawsuits seeking recovery for reproductive harm127 sound in negligence128 under the claims of “wrongful life” and “wrongful birth,”129 terms
which are mangled and commingled by the courts.130 Strictly speaking,
121. See Hannah Crocker, Super Dad Sperm Donor Has 800 Children and Becomes a
Father Once a Week, MIRROR, (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/
super-dad-sperm-donor-800-7170289.
122. Dan Gong et al., An Overview on Ethical Issues About Sperm Donation, 11 ASIAN J.
ANDROLOGY 645, 646 (2009).
123. The “American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) recommends a limit of
25 children per population of 800 000 for a single donor.” Id. (This would allow an individual donor to sire about one hundred children in the United States (!)). See also Repetitive Oocyte Donation: A Committee Opinion, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED. 1, 1 (2014),
https://www.asrm.org/globalassets/asrm/asrm-content/news-and-publications/practiceguidelines/for-non-members/repetitive_oocyte_donation-noprint.pdf.
124. See Goodwin, supra note 18 (exploring “the viability of tort law to address the private and costly harms resulting from negligent application of ART”); see also HENRY T.
GREELY, THE END OF SEX AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 226–27 (2016) (noting
that if reproductive services “did not produce the promised results for relatively straightforward genetic traits, a malpractice suit would be a plausible response (although it is unclear
when the parents would be entitled to any damages)”).
125. Miotke v. City of Spokane, 678 P.2d 803, 821 (Wash. 1984).
126. See Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story—An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116, 143 (1968).
127. Gregory G. Sarno, Tort Liability for Wrongfully Causing One to Be Born, 83 A.L.R.
3d 15, 2 (2011).
128. See Kilduff, supra note 99, at 23–26.
129. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967); James v. Caserta, 332
S.E.2d 872, 879 (W. Va. 1985).
130. See e.g., Collins v. Xytex Corp., 2015 WL 6387328 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2015).
The saga begins with Judge McBurney framing the Collins case in wrongful life terms but
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“wrongful life” is the child’s claim for being born.131 Parents seeking damages (e.g., for cost of child-rearing, extra care, etc.) bring “wrongful birth”
cases.132 “Wrongful conception” refines that claim and refers to the parents’
“lost chance” to avoid birthing a healthy but undesired child,133 such as
when the physician fails to perform a sterilization procedure correctly. By
comparison, the narrow wrongful birth definition traditionally referred to
instances where the physician failed to detect or advise of a genetic defect,
depriving parents of the right to abortion.134
The tort with the “teeth” (i.e., having deterrence value) is the wrongful
life claim because it would include the child’s claim for pain and suffering
which supports claims for punitive damages. This claim, however, has been
uniformly rejected, except in three states: California,135 New Jersey,136 and

commingling the concept with wrongful birth, “the claim most closely (though by no means
perfectly) fits a claim for wrongful birth—and so is not allowed. The reason for this is both
simple and profound: courts are ‘unwilling to say that life, even life with severe impairments,
may ever amount to a legal injury.’” Id. at *2 (citing Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp.
v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 561 (Ga. 1990)). Subsequently, the same set of facts was brought
before the Georgia courts in Norman v. Xytex, and the claim was recalibrated as being
brought under wrongful birth parameters without including wrongful life language, as Judge
McBurney, who also decided the Collins case, now recognizes that “careful use of terminology is essential.” Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, Norman v. Xytex, No.
2017CV298536 (Sup. Ct. Fulton Cty. Ga. 2017). See generally Billauer, Re-Birthing, supra
note 11.
131. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 955 (Cal. 1982); see also Alan J. Belsky, Injury
As a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the Wrongful Life Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV.
185, 187 (1993).
132. Wrongful Birth, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (6th ed. 1990); see also Becker v.
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. 1978).
133. E.g., Sofia Yakren, Wrongful Birth Claims and the Paradox of Parenting a Child
with a Disability, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 583, 588 (2018).
134. Thomas D. Rogers, III, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in
Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C. L. REV. 27, 54 (1982). See also Order on
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at n. 6, Norman v. Xytex, No. 2017CV298536 (Sup. Ct.
Fulton Cty. Ga. 2018) (noting that wrongful conception cases involve “only those claims in
which the alleged negligence resulted in undesired conception,” which generally results in a
healthy child).
135. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983); Stewart-Graves v.
Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151, 1160 (Wash. 2007) (“In recognizing a wrongful life claim, this court
reasoned that it would be anomalous to permit recovery by parents alone.”).
136. Geler v. Akawie, 818 A.2d 402, 413 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (citing Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979)); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984)
(holding that “a child or his parents may recover special damages for extraordinary medical
expenses incurred during infancy, and that the infant may recover those expenses during his
majority”). But see Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967) (where the court
rejected such a claim).
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Washington.137 Citing moralistic/public policy concerns,138 courts deem the
wrongful life claim societally abhorrent.139 Some courts say there is no separate tort for wrongful life; 140 rather, wrongful life is a descriptor of damages
traditionally sought in the context of negligence claims.141 Thus, notwithstanding contortive efforts to make it work, e.g., calling the claim “products
liability,”142 it is generally not countenanced,143 being inconsistent with judicial views144 of normative conduct (i.e., that any life, even one with disability,145 is better than no life146).
Recovery in wrongful birth claims, while generally allowed, for the
most part is limited.147 Recoverable damages usually adhere to economic
damages occasioned to the parents by the pregnancy and birth itself148 (assuming the harm is timely discovered)149 for peri-pregnancy-related physical
harm, sometimes including emotional distress,150 for child-rearing—but generally only for an unhealthy child.151 Related claims sound in bailment for a
prospective parent’s property damage claim for lost/damaged genetic mate137. See Wuth v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 359 P.3d 841, 852–55 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing damages resulting from a doctor’s failure to diagnose chromosomal translocation in
IVF embryos).
138. “Because wrongful life claims force courts to weigh the value of being versus nonbeing, courts have been reluctant to recognize this cause of action.” Hester v. Dwivedi, 733
N.E. 2d 1161, 1164 (Ohio 2000).
139. In Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ill. 1983), the court expressed an
“unwillingness to hold that the birth of a normal healthy child can be judged to be an injury
to the parents,” because such a notion “offends fundamental values attached to human life.”
140. D.D. v. Idant Labs., 374 Fed. App’x, 319 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’g Donovan v. Idant
Labs., 625 F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
141. As did the court in D.D. v. Idant Labs (the Donovan appeal). Id. at 324.
142. Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., N. Div., 623 A.2d 3, 4–5 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993) (dismissing a suit over alleged contamination of embryos with AIDS through positivetested placental blood used in IVF).
143. Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9 (Wis. 1974) (where the court refused to recognize a
cause of action for wrongful birth or wrongful life). In Slawek, the infant-plaintiff was born a
normal child, although illegitimate. She sued her putative father for embarrassment, humiliation, and lack of social standing she would endure—and lost.
144. Zelt v. Xytex, No. 1:17-CV-4851-TWT, 2018 WL 1014627 at *7 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 22,
2018); Norman v. Xytex, No. 2017CV298536 (Sup. Ct. Fulton Cty. Ga. 2018).
145. Donovan, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
146. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. 1978).
147. Emerson v. Magandanz, 689 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1997) (but see Becker, 386 N.E.2d at
809, for distinction regarding recovery for wrongful conception and wrongful birth cases).
See also Kathleen Mahoney, Note, Malpractice Claims Resulting from Negligent Preconception Genetic Testing: Do These Claims Present a Strain of Wrongful Birth or Wrongful Conception, and Does the Categorization Even Matter?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 773 (2016); See
also Billauer, Re-Birthing, supra note 11.
148. See, e.g., Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995).
149. See Donovan, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 266–268.
150. Emerson v. Magandanz, 689 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1997).
151. Id.
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rial.152 None of these awards are sufficiently onerous to perform a deterrence
function153 which requires repeated levies of damages that would be deemed
“punitive.”154 And none, according to at least one commentator,155 are sufficient to compensate sperm bank victims for far-reaching emotional harms156
which generally are not covered under negligence157 unless accompanied by
a physical harm158 or if the claimants fall under a prescribed zone of danger.159 That means the mother (or parent(s)) cannot sue for the emotional
angst of raising a child with a disability or for raising an unwanted child,
and the child, who cannot sue for his or her own pain and suffering,160can
neither sue for emotional disturbances related thereto.
The underlying fabric of the current state of the law, as discussed
above, derived from cases sounding in medical malpractice where the wrong
was occasioned by a physician or other medical personnel. The holdings,
however, continued to be applied, almost robotically perhaps, when harm
was occasioned by a profit-generating sperm bank. While superficially the
resultant injuries might seem similar, they can differ both qualitatively and
quantitatively (i.e., regarding the number of persons affected), as we shall
see. The consequent inequitable results (discussed below) call into question
the propriety of utilizing malpractice-generated holdings in cases involving
newer reproductive technologies such as sperm banks and IVF facilities.

152. See Yearworth v. N. Bristol NHS Trust, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 37.
153. See Rheingold, supra note 126, at 143.
154. Greco, 893 P.2d at 345.
155. See Fox, supra note 16.
156. See, e.g., Rice v. Veleanu, 227 A.D.2d 607 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (citing Howard v.
Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1977)) (denying recovery to parents for the emotional disturbance they suffered watching their infant die from Tay-Sachs disease which could have been
detected with appropriate tests); see also O’Toole v. Greenberg, 477 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1985).
157. O’Toole, 477 N.E.2d at 448; Fox, supra note 16, at 154; see also Deirdre A.
McDonnell, Increased Risk of Disease Damages: Proportional Recovery as an Alternative to
the All or Nothing System Exemplified by Asbestos Cases, 24 ENVTL. AFF. 623, 624 (1997).
158. See generally Aaron Twerski & Jim Henderson, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad:
Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53
S.C. L. REV. 814, 828 (2002); see also McDonnell, supra note 157, at 624.
159. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 158, at 824–25.
160. Duffey v. Fear, 121 A.D.2d 928, 928–930 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); see also Alquijay
v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 473 N.E.2d 244, 244 (N.Y. 1984); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190
N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) (the first recorded wrongful life case); see generally Tatiana E. Posada, Whose Sperm Is It Anyways In the Wild, Wild
West of The Fertility Industry?, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 847 (2018); see especially Barbara
Pfeffer Billauer, Wrongful Life in the Age of Crispr-Cas, 142 PENN ST. L. REV. forthcoming
(Winter 2020).
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An illustrative review of cases involving sperm bank malfeasance

The first case against a sperm bank seeking recovery for the child’s
pain and suffering was Johnson v. Superior Ct.161 where Brittany Johnson
claimed damages for her inheritance of Autosomal Dominant Polycystic
Kidney Disease from an anonymous sperm donor under theories of negligence and breach of contract. Notwithstanding consensual contractual protection of the sperm donor’s identity, the court required its disclosure. But,
when it came to awarding damages, the court ruled that the claims constituted “wrongful life” and were not recognized.
The second case, Paretta v. Medical Offices for Human Reproduction,162 was brought a year later in New York. Here, claims were brought for
malpractice, fraud, and negligence. Punitive damages were also claimed.
The anonymous supplier carried the gene for cystic fibrosis, which was apparently known to the reproduction center but not disclosed to the parents.163
Neither was the father tested for the disease, a critical factor, since both parents must be carriers for the disease to manifest in the offspring. Indeed, the
double donation of genetic material carrying the cystic fibrosis gene resulted
in a child being born with the disease. But the court determined the child did
not have the right to sue for wrongful life—even in the presence of demonstrable acts of medical negligence—because such a case would grant the
IVF child rights not possessed by naturally born children. The court did,
however, leave some claims open and allowed the case to proceed. Because
of that ruling, coupled with fear of punitive damages, the case settled for a
whopping 1.3 million dollars.164
The third case, Donovan v. Idant Laboratories,165 was also occasioned
by an anonymous sperm supplier and resulted in a child born with the genetically transmitted Fragile X syndrome. Here, the court shut the door on disclosure of the sperm supplier’s identity (on bioethics and privacy grounds),
challenging the parents to prove the causal relationship between the supplier’s sperm and the child’s Fragile X syndrome. Efforts by the sperm bank to
assuage the parents’ suspicion by supplying expert reports falsely claiming
no causal connection—actions countenanced by the court—resulted in the
statute of limitations being breached, ultimately causing the mother to lose
161. Johnson v. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 867 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 2000).
162. Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641–642 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2003).
163. At least one similar case, which did not result in suit, occurred in 2012, suggesting
there may be many more such cases of which the legal community is unaware. See Jacqueline
Mroz, Sheer Number of Inheritor Kids Up Genetic Risk, DENVER POST, May 15, 2002, at 1A.
164. Heled, supra, note 38, at 266.
165. Donovan v. Idant Labs, 625 F. Supp. 2d 256, 274 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
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her cause of action for wrongful birth as time-barred. The child’s Fragile X
syndrome was eventually traced to the genetic input from the sperm supplier, but her claim was similarly dismissed. In fact, nine causes of action were
raised, and they were all rejected. While the court ruled that sperm is a product and hence initial elements of a products liability claim were pleaded, it
nonetheless ruled the damages sounded in wrongful life, which is not recognized by New York.166
The fourth case, Collins v. Xytex,167 sought damages which were described by the court in language reminiscent of wrongful life claims, but
called wrongful birth, for, inter alia, the child’s increased risk of developing
schizophrenia. It, too, was occasioned by an anonymous sperm supplier and
was the harbinger of more than a dozen lawsuits (hereinafter referred to as
the Xytex Saga). With one exception, these children have not yet manifested
a diagnosable disease168 but are at risk and the mothers are apprehensive. All
but one case was dismissed as being claims for wrongful birth. I return to
the Xytex Saga as a case study of sperm-banks-done-wrong in Part IV.
III. GREATER AND LESSER HARMS: FRAMING A HARM-DRIVEN APPROACH
In this section, rather than focusing on the causal act or its consequences to conceptualize injury, the traditional negligence approach, I propose
focusing on the harm caused and assessing it according to its gravity and
magnitude. This perspective derives from a public-health-oriented approach
which concentrates on prevention.169 Incorporating the tort-based objective
of deterrence with this rubric, rather than the traditional focus of punitive or
restorative justice, also provides a remedy that has heretofore been lacking.
A.

Novel Frames and New Claims

Numerous (and futile) attempts have been made to address the legal lacuna resulting from rejection of the wrongful life claim, including invoking
166. Id. at 275; D.D. v. Idant Labs., 374 Fed. App’x. 319, 324 (3d Cir. 2010); see infra
notes 162–64.
167. Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct.
20, 2015). See also supra note 130 and accompanying text.
168. Apparently, some children do manifest emotional difficulties—although, at present,
have not been diagnosed with an actual medical or psychological condition.
169. The “gravity” of harm rubric is first noted in the case of Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925) as it affects an individual; magnitude of harm is a public health concept
referring to the number of people in a population affected. See Chris Degeling, Culling and
the Common Good: Re-evaluating Harms and Benefits Under the One Health Paradigm, 9
PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 244 (2016). See also Marcel Verweij, Infectious Disease Control, in
PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS: KEY CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN POLICY AND PRACTICE (Angus Dawson
ed., 2011).
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the doctrine of strict liability in tort.170 These claims fail for the very reason
the negligence claims fail.171 While bypassing proof of breach of a standard
of care, products liability claims172 still require proof of damages173—and
these damages are the very same ones rejected under the negligence theories
of wrongful life or wrongful birth.174
Other efforts have been made to address the void, and various intrepid
courts, commentators, and stakeholders have tried to construct alternative
remedies. These include the legal claims of loss of genetic identity (which is
limited to switched sperm or oocytes in the context of a marital unit)175 and
criminal legislation, called “fertility fraud.”176 Additionally, the legal lacuna
prompted Professor Dov Fox to craft an entirely new cause of action: reproductive negligence.177 His system describes reproductive harm by conse-

170. Francis Sohn, Products Liability and the Fertility Industry: Overcoming Some Problems in “Wrongful Life”, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J., 145, 171 (2009).
171. “As plaintiff has not alleged a legally cognizable injury, she has failed to state a
claim for strict liability . . .” Donovan v. Idant Labs. 625 F. Supp. 2d. 256. 276 (E.D. Pa.
2009).
172. Megan D. McIntyre, Comment: The Potential for Products Liability Actions When
Artificial Insemination by an Anonymous Donor Produces Children with Genetic Defects, 98
DICK. L. REV. 519, 540–41 (1993); Dawn R. Swink & J. Brad Reich, Caveat Vendor: Potential Progeny, Paternity and Product Liability Online, 857 BYU L. REV. (2007); Anne-Marie
Abarado, Donovan v. Idant Laboratories: Circumventing the Prohibition Against Wrongful
Life Claims Through Strict Products Liability Claims, Health Law Perspectives, UNIV. OF
HOUS. L. CTR., (Nov.13, 2009), http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2009/(AA)
%20Donovan.pdf; Jennifer Vagle, Putting the “Product” in Reproduction: The Viability of a
Products Liability Action for Genetically Defective Sperm, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1175 (2011).
173. Doherty v. Merck & Co., Inc., 154 A.3d 1202, 1206 (Me. 2017) (barring wrongful
life applies not only to medical malpractice actions but to product liability suits as well); see
also Norman v. Xytex, No. 2017CV298536 (Ga. 2018); Alex Stein, Reproductive Negligence
Under Maine Law, BILL OF HEALTH (March 19, 2018), http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu
/2018/03/19/reproductive-negligence-under-maine-law/.
174. Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct.
20, 2015).
175. Suresh Viswanath, An Analysis of Genetic Affinity as an Actionable Head of Damages—ACB v. Thomson Medical PTE LTD, 8 SING. L. REV. (2016/17).
176. Ariana Eunjung Cha, Fertility Fraud: People Conceived Through Errors, Misdeeds
in the Industry Are Pressing for Justice, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/fertility-fraud-people-conceivedthrough-errors-misdeeds-in-the-industry-are-pressing-for-justice/2018/11/22/02550ab0-c81d11e8-9b1c-a90f1daae309_story.html?utm_term=.7f094333ce1a.
177. “Reproductive negligence inflicts a distinct and substantial injury . . . that goes beyond any bodily intrusion or emotional distress. The harm is being robbed of the ability to
determine the conditions under which to procreate . . . [and] the wrongful frustration of reproductive plans disrupts personal and professional lives in predictable and dramatic ways.
This puzzle—that the thwarting of reproductive plans, however egregious or devastating,
invades no ‘legally protected interest,’ violates no right [and]—has gone all but unnoticed in
the case law and the literature.” See Fox, supra note 16, at 155–157; see also Dov Fox, Mak-
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quence (although not severity):178 pregnancy imposed (e.g., failed sterilization efforts or the failure of a medical professional to diagnose a condition in
utero and inform/advise the parents, depriving them of the right of abortion);
pregnancy denied (e.g., wrongful destruction of gametes); and pregnancy
confounded (e.g., frustrating the desire to select for or against a child with
particular genetic features).179 Professor Fox’s proposal has been amply dissected by no less than three legal academics,180 and will not be addressed
here. It is important, however, to echo Professor Fox’s lament that emotional injury—often the signature harm of reproductive failures—goes uncompensated in the traditional systems of redress. This lacuna in legal redress
that Professor Fox so clearly identifies must not be ignored.
New causes of action, however, are slow to gain traction (even if they
are ultimately embraced), and a more immediate solution is required. Further, regarding Professor Fox’s “pregnancy confounded” category, the state
of genetic knowledge makes it impossible to screen for all genetically involved diseases, rendering a negligence claim too limited to fully address
the panoply of greater harms (more fully discussed in Part IV). Framing the
problem solely as the need to allow broader recovery (i.e., focusing only on
restorative or compensatory justice) also overlooks possibilities for prevention or deterrence. Instead, I suggest that focusing on severity and magnitude of harm—a public health and public nuisance approach—allows for
broader relief, including injunctions, but also enlarges the class of plaintiffs
as well as providing for deterrence.
Most sperm bank errors181 (as opposed to physician-induced reproductive harms) occur as a result of a failure to comply with standard protocol
and internal procedures.182 These manifest in three forms: 1) destruction (or
loss) of gametes (eggs, sperm or embryos); 2) “contamination with cellular

ing Things Right When Reproductive Medicine Goes Wrong: Reply to Robert Rabin, Carol
Sanger, and Gregory Keating, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE, 94, 94–117 (2018).
178. Professor Fox apparently comes to realize that his initial consolidation of claims into
one overriding conglomerate is unworkable. Id. at 100–101; see also Robert L. Rabin, Dov
Fox on Reproductive Negligence: A Commentary, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 228 (2017).
179. When procreation is confounded in ways that frustrate plans for a child of a particular type, courts typically deny redress fearing validating parents’ disparagement of their
child’s life. See e.g., Doe v. Irvine Sci. Sales Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 737, 743 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(finding plaintiffs who had their in vitro procedures contaminated could not establish a physical injury and the economic-loss rule barred their claims for recovery).
180. See Carol Sanger, The Lopsided Harms of Reproductive Negligence, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. ONLINE 29 (2017); Gregory C. Keating, Response to Fox: Impaired Conditions, Frustrated Expectations and the Law of Torts, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 212 (2017); Rabin,
supra note 178.
181. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
182. IVF Blunders, supra note 93.
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debris,” meaning the wrong sperm was used;183 and 3) switched embryos.184
These harms generally affect individuals, with the third possibly contributing a small societal impact. Here, I focus on a fourth type of harm, one
which significantly affects society as well as the individuals and which I call
a “greater” harm.185 This fourth category of greater harms introduces inherited diseases into the population at rates above the background level by creating genetically impaired children.
I begin the inquiry in Section B by setting out the criteria to delineate
greater and lesser harms. In Section C, I identify three practices that lead to
this greater harm and, hence, are ripe for targeted regulation: anonymous
sperm supply, the failure to properly screen (or test) sperm suppliers, and
multiple (unlimited) inseminations. The dire situation that occurs when all
three practices are utilized in concert is examined in Part IV.
B.

Criteria for Delineation as Greater or Lesser Harms

To delineate harms as “lesser” or “greater,” the following framework is
suggested: in a nutshell, “lesser” harms affect the parent and also the child,
while “greater” harms affect the parent, the child, and society at large. Lesser harms can be addressed under existing theories of law. Claims where improper diagnoses or tests prevent parents from aborting a child186 or physician actions which frustrate the desire to avoid having children (what I call
“Category I” harm) can be addressed under the traditional rubric of medical
malpractice (or wrongful conception).187 Next are cases where genetic mate183. See, e.g., Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, LLC, 230 F. Supp. 3d 865 (N.D. Ill.
2017); ACB v. Thomson Medical PTE Ltd, [2017] SGCA 20, (Ct. App. Sing., Mar. 22, 2017)
Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2015.
184. See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text; see also Jonathan Turley, English
Couple Sues After Their Last Embryo is Implanted in the Wrong Woman, JONATHAN TURLEY
(June 15, 2009), https://jonathanturley.org/2009/06/15/english-couple-sues-after-their-lastembryo-is-implanted-in-wrong-woman/; Embryo Mix-up Parents to Speak Out, BBC NEWS
(June 15, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/8098553.stm.
185. See infra Part IV.
186. Where a child born with a disease would have been aborted had the parents known
of the disease pre-birth, that child might have a wrongful life claim although it would be
inappropriate to say the child was causally injured, as can be said about the child born of via
sperm bank involvement or IVF. This scenario suggests that abrogating wrongful life in the
entirety is unfair, and that it should be resurrected with broader tentacles or a looser definition
in the IVF or sperm bank context.
187. Thus, in Georgia, “wrongful conception” mimics some types of wrongful birth cases
and is allowed, but wrongful birth is not. Zelt v. Xytex Corp., No. 1:17-CV-4851-TWT, 2018
WL 1014627, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 22, 2018), aff’d, 766 F. App’x 735 (11th Cir. 2019). The
claims raised in Collins v. Xytex, which more closely resembled wrongful life, somehow
morphed into a strict wrongful life claim in its various iterations. See also Norman v. Xytex,
No. 2017CV298536 (Sup. Ct. Fulton Cty. Ga. 2017).
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rial (considered property) goes astray, is lost, or destroyed—a “Category II”
type harm, which can be considered violation of property rights or bailment.
Another stratum (“Category III” harm) occurs where the wrong sperm is
implanted. This can infringe on a patient’s autonomy, violates informed
consent, and theoretically could be addressed under consumer fraud or misrepresentation. These injuries (what Professor Fox might call pregnancy
imposed or pregnancy denied) would all be considered to be lesser harms,
although they may be of varying degree. A more severe Category III harm
occurs when the wrong embryo is implanted, leading to custody battles
which tax the court system.188 A “Category IV” harm, which I refer to as a
“greater” harm, occurs where the acts of the sperm bank create genetic
anomalies in the resultant child. Here, the child, parent, and society all suffer. The remainder of this article focuses on Category IV or greater harms,
illustrated by the Xytex Saga and discussed in greater detail in Part IV.
C.

Sperm Bank Practices Fostering the Greater Harms
1.

Anonymity

Historically, all donor insemination was anonymous, as physicians encouraged married couples using donor insemination to pretend their children
were biologically related to their husbands.189 Discussing the full array of
consequences of anonymity190 goes beyond the scope of this article;191 the
key point here is that not knowing the father’s identity increases the likelihood of unwitting incest.192 Perhaps since the notion is so gut-wrenchingly
troubling, policy enactments attempt to prevent it. But besides what bioethicist Arthur Caplan calls the “yuck factor,”193 solid biological reasons exist to
prevent consanguinity,194 including increased risk of disease195 and increases
188. See KARLA HOLLOWAY, PRIVATE BODIES, PUBLIC TEXTS 54-58, 181-219 (2011).
189. KIM TOEVES & STEPHANIE BRILL, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO LESBIAN CONCEPTION,
PREGNANCY AND BIRTH 129–45 (2002); see also SPAR, supra note 54, at 22.
190. For example, anonymity deprives offspring of their right to a genetic (biological)
identity. See CASEBOOK ON BIOETHICS FOR JUDGES 129 (Amnon Carmi & Barbara P. Billauer
eds., 2016).
191. A large body of literature exists on the topic of the consequences of anonymity. See,
e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Lost Children: When the Right to Children Conflicts with the
Rights of Children, 8 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 (2014); see also Grady, supra note 60.
192. See Proposed Israeli Sperm Bank Bill, supra note 115.
193. See generally Charles W. Schmidt, The Yuck Factor: When Disgust Meets Discovery, ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 12, A524–A527 (2008).
194. Raja M. Afzal et al., The Impact of Consanguinity on the Frequency of Inborn Errors of Metabolism, 15 MOLECULAR GENETICS METABOLISM REP. 1, 8–10 (2018).
195. See Lutfi Jaber et al., The Impact of Consanguinity Worldwide 1 COMMUNITY
GENETICS 13, 14 (1998) (“Several studies have shown that the rate of congenital malformations . . . is approximately 2.5 times higher than that among the offspring of unrelated
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in sterility, stillbirths, perinatal losses, and neonatal deaths.196 The increased
associated health costs197 prompt society to minimize such liaisons to lower
population health costs.
Proponents of anonymity champion its use because it protects fathers
from child support claims (which is probably a specious notion since statutes should protect donors from such claims).198 Others claim that when
young, an unmarried sperm supplier needing money may volunteer his
sperm without thought of the future. Years later, the sperm supplier, now
perhaps a successful politician, might fear embarrassing contact with his
genetic children and assert that the ennobling “donation” of his youth should
not be used as fodder against him.199 Anonymity is also championed by
those who fear that disclosure would limit semen supply, a “right” loudly
defended by sperm bank operators who roundly protest attempts to revoke
it,200 even in the face of stakeholders (children of anonymous suppliers) desperately seeking a genetic identity201—if only to learn of disease risk.
In actuality, the practice of anonymity may increase sperm availability—illustrated by the abrupt falloff in sperm supply in Canada when anonymity was abolished.202 But the trade-offs are disastrous: all reported
wrongful life/birth cases against sperm banks in the United States arose in
the context of anonymous sperm donors.203
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of anonymous suppliers is that it
encourages faulty responses on donor questionnaires. As the putative donor
becomes effectively sui generis if his identity cannot be disclosed, he can
get away with fraudulent responses—most significantly to questions about
medical history and educational background. Since, as we have seen (and
will see), financial remuneration for the supplier is often contingent on the
quality of the questionnaire responses, although not necessarily the quality
of his sperm, there is motivation to be less than candid.
parents . . . .”); but see Alan H. Bittles, Assessing the Influence of Consanguinity on Congenital Heart Disease, 4 ANNALS PEDIATRIC CARDIOLOGY 2, 11 (2011) (suggesting that the assumption that consanguinity increases risk of certain types of heart disease may be flawed).
196. Jaber et al., supra note 195, at 14.
197. Id. at 15.
198. Although instances have occurred where the sperm supplier was charged with child
support, notwithstanding both private agreements and statutory authority which should have
prevented it. See DAAR, supra note 48.
199. CAHN, supra note 2, at 220–226.
200. Held at the Netanya Academic College in Netanya, Israel, in conjunction with
AYALA (the Israeli Reproduction Society) on Feb. 20, 2018.
201. Margaret K. Nelson et al., Gamete Donor Anonymity and Limits on Numbers of
Offspring: The Views of Three Stakeholders, J. L. & BIOSCIENCES (Apr. 2016).
202. CAHN, supra note 2, at 228. In fact, there are only three registered sperm providers
in Canada, and Canadian women are forced to go to the United States or seek sperm elsewhere. See CAHN, supra 2, at 228 (opining that the Canadian situation is an anomaly).
203. At least as far as I can determine.
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While enlightened countries in the EU now prevent anonymous donations (Britain allows disclosure after a child is eighteen),204 the practice continues in countries such as the United States and Denmark (coincidentally
the world’s largest sperm exporters), although for an additional fee, consumers can now procure “open” disclosure sperm from some U.S. suppliers.205
2.

Unlimited Sperm “Donations”

As noted, recommendations and advisories exist in many places to limit sperm donations and legislation exists in others, but enforcement is poor
and abuses are horrific. For starters, there is the American mathematics professor who is banned from fathering children in Israel because he was too
prolific (at thirty-three children with ten more on the way),206 two American
physicians fathering fifty207 and seventy-five208 children respectively (the
latter convicted of fifty-two counts of fraud), and a California “gentleman”
fathering 150 children.209 The American experiences are far from unique.
204. HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., RULES AROUND RELEASING
DONOR INFORMATION, https://www.hfea.gov.uk/donation/donors/rules-around-releasingdonor-information/ (last visited September 17, 2019).
205. See Donor Options, XYTEX, https://www.xytex.com/patient-information/donoroptions/ (last visited September 29, 2019). The website provides that as of August 2018, the
company no longer will accept donors who wish to remain fully anonymous. Perhaps in
response to the recent spate cases against it.
206. Caron Creighton, US Serial Sperm Donor Banned from Donating in Israel,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 19, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-0618/us-serial-sperm-donor-banned-from-donating-in-israel; see also Why Won’t Israel Allow
Women to Use Sperm from Serial Donor Ari Nagel? Its Supreme Court Wants to Know,
JEWISH TELEGRAPH AGENCY (Oct 18, 2018), https://www.jta.org/2018/10/08/israel/wontisrael-allow-women-use-sperm-serial-donor-ari-nagel-supreme-court-wants-know (“Israel’s
Supreme Court has ordered the country’s Health Ministry to explain why it will not allow an
Israeli woman to undergo in vitro fertilization using the sperm of a Jewish Brooklyn mathematics professor.”).
207. Susan Scutti, Indiana Fertility Doctor Used His Own Sperm ‘Around 50 Times,’
Papers Say, CNN (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/13/health/fertility-doctorimpregnate-patients/index.html; Mihir Zaveri, A Fertility Doctor Used His Sperm on Unwitting Women. Their Children Want Answers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/us/fertility-doctor-pregnant-women.html.
208. Marlene Cimons, Too Many Daves: Fertility Doctor’s Case Raises Ethical Concerns, L.A. TIMES (Feb 13, 1992), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-02-13-mn3023-story.html; Doctor Is Found Guilty in Fertility Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 1992)
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/05/us/doctor-is-found-guilty-in-fertility-case.html;
see
also Marlene Cimons, Fertility Doctor’s Case Raises Ethical Concerns: Health: Physician’s
Secret Use of His Own Sperm Violates His Patients’ Privacy, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES (Feb.
13, 1992), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-02-13-mn-3023-story.html.
209. Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm Donor, 150 Offspring, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/06donor.html; cf. Elizabeth Payne, Lawsuit
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One report indicated that a British supplier fathered more than sixty-five
children.210 Additionally, two British men are said to have fathered six hundred children each211 and a third reportedly sired eight hundred children
(!).212 Most recently, BioEdge reported that a Dutch man may have fathered
one thousand children, donating regularly at three sperm clinics for some
twenty years with some of his sperm exported to other European countries.213
When the practice of unlimited sperm donations is coupled with anonymity, the likelihood of incest increases. Ten years ago, Lord David Alton
cited a case of incest between fraternal twins separated at birth, remarking
that “this isn’t a regular occurrence, but it could become one with large
numbers of people now being born by IVF and not knowing their true identities.”214
3.

Inadequate Screening/Testing/Vetting for Genetic Diseases

Perhaps more worrisome than the risk of incest215 are actual instances
of genetically transmitted disease which occur when sperm banks do not
properly vet the suppliers, fail to verify their application responses, or fail to
take an appropriate medical history. But even more serious than the single
Against Fertility Doctor Accused of Using Own Sperm Expands to 150 People ‘Adversely
Affected’, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Apr. 6, 2018), https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/
lawsuit-against-fertility-doctor-accused-of-using-own-sperm-expands-to-150-peopleadversely-affected (reporting on Dr. Norman Barwin, a fertility doctor accused of using own
sperm to father 150 children).
210. Alex Green, Fatheroo! Married Man Who Travels UK Offering Door-to-Door
Sperm Delivery Service from a White Van . . . Has 65 Children and Hopes to Reach 100,
DAILY MAIL (May 22, 2018), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5755681/Marriedman-offers-door-door-sperm-delivery-service-65-children-hopes-reach-100.htm.
211. Crocker, supra note 121 (“Simon Watson, 41, has been dishing out his semen for 16
years and sells bottles of ‘magic potion’ for £50 online. He now sells his sperm on Facebook
and has raked in at least £40,000 for his efforts.”); see also Smith, supra note 120 (“A British
fertility doctor may have fathered 600 children by repeatedly using his own sperm in a fertility clinic he ran.”).
212. Linda Wiilaars, Unlicensed Sperm Donor Claims to Have Fathered 800 Children,
BIONEWS (Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_95350; see also Natalie Morton
& Sarah Bell, I Fathered 800 Children, Claims Sperm Donor, BBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-35262535; see also Crocker, supra note 121 (“A man
thought to be Britain’s most prolific sperm donor has fathered a unbelievable 800 children
after selling his semen for £50 a go.”).
213. Michael Cook, Dutch Man May Have Fathered 1000 Children, BIOEDGE
(Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.bioedge.org/bioethics/dutch-man-may-have-fathered-1000children/12844.
214. See Unwitting Incest a ‘Tragedy’, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Jan. 12, 2008),
https://www.smh.com.au/world/unwitting-incest-a-tragedy-20080112-gdrwkn.html.
215. See Bittles, supra note 195.
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transfer of genetic disease are instances where the supplier, a carrier of genetic disease, fathers more than one child. Such multiple instances of genetic
disease transfer can happen even if the sperm supplier or bank has no reason
to know of the likelihood of a compromised genetic medical history. Several
such instances have not resulted in lawsuits and hence remain under the legal (and to a certain extent public health) radar.216 Thus, in 2006, the Journal
of Pediatrics reported a case of five of the eleven children sired by an anonymous supplier from a Michigan sperm bank inheriting a serious blood disease that leaves them at risk for leukemia.217 In 2009, the Journal of the
American Medical Association reported an apparently healthy twenty-threeyear-old donor with no known genetic or infectious diseases who passed on
a genetic heart condition to at least eight of his twenty-two offspring; one
died from heart failure as a toddler.218 One donor in the Netherlands who
fathered eighteen children was later found to have a serious neurological
disease that his offspring have a 50/50 chance of inheriting.219
The sad results of the joint practice of anonymity and inadequate
screening were the subject of the Xytex cases referenced earlier and described below.220 In Part IV we will explore in greater depth these dire consequences which occur when the failure to properly screen the applicant is
combined with anonymity and multiple impregnations.
IV. SETTING THE STAGE FOR NUISANCE CLAIMS AGAINST SPERM BANKS
In Section A, I set the stage for use of public nuisance for greater
harms generated by sperm banks. I begin with a case study of four cases. In
Section B, I discuss the medical issues (diseases) which are personal harms.
In Section C, I discuss the population level ramifications of genetic aspects
of the diseases, and in Section D, I detail population costs.

216. Jennifer Wolff Perrine, The Truth About Donor 1084, SELF (Oct. 23, 2006),
https://www.self.com/story/sperm-banks-hide-evidence (describing a supplier from Fairfax
Cryobank who transmitted asthma and severe eczema to four offspring, such that their skin
“peeled off like an onion.”).
217. See Laurence A. Boxer et al., Strong Evidence for Autosomal Dominant Inheritance
of Severe Congenital Neutropenia Associated With ELA2 Mutations, 148 J. PEDIATRICS, 633–
36 (2006); Grady, supra note 60.
218. Maron, supra note 29 at 1681.
219. Grady, supra note 60. And as we go to press, a report of at least a dozen autistic
children born of sperm from donor H898 was reported. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, The Children or Donor H898, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
health/the-children-of-donor-h898/2019/09/14/dcc191d8-86da-11e9-a49125df61c78dc4_story.html.
220. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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The Xytex Quartet: A Case Study

A dozen or more cases have been brought against the Xytex Corporation, not only in Georgia where Xytex is headquartered, but also in Canada,
California, and Florida. I focus on four seminal cases, which I call the “Xytex Quartet.” All but one case was dismissed; the last is on appeal.221 The
single case which was not dismissed222 generated multiple settlements, as
apparently Xytex feared the punitive wrath of a jury.
The decisions sequentially release more and more sordid details of Xytex’s practices, unravelling the soap-opera-like story223 of “Donor” 9623.224
Peeling off the layers of Xytex’s conduct should put us all on alert, as there
is no reason to think that Xytex alone, among the five hundred or so existing
sperm banks,225 employs the practices that occasioned the harms to the children of Donor 9623.226 Further, other than removing certain advertisements
from the web and establishing a new category of (more expensive) donorsuppliers, where the supplier relinquishes absolute anonymity,227 we have no
assurance Xytex has revamped its screening and marketing practices.
1.

Collins v. Xytex

The saga begins with Collins v. Xytex Corp.228 After enactment of the
2004 Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act which criminalized payment for sperm suppliers, a sperm shortage ensued229 and “Canadians seeking sperm [were] . . . largely at the mercy of foreign markets, primarily the
221. Norman v. Xytex Corp., 830 S.E.2d 267, 268 (Ga. App. 2019) (pet. for writ of
certiorari filed in Ga. Sup. Ct., July 11, 2019).
222. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
223. TV and film portray sperm bank errors as either juicy morsels of comedy (Delivery
Man) or tragedy. See also Aaron Foley, The Unsung Legacy of Black Characters on Soap
Operas, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/
2015/03/soap-operas-the-forgotten-birthplace-of-complex-black-characters-on-tv/388907/.
224. I put “donor” in quotes because after all, he isn’t really donating.
225. See John K. Critser, Current Status of Semen Banking in the USA, 13 HUM. REPROD.
55, 57 (1998) (indicating that if all IVF facilities were included in the count, the number
might reach more than 800).
226. Indeed, in an analog of the Xytex Saga, an autistic supplier of California Cryobank,
Donor 3099, produced seven children, of which four have either autism or autism-related
disorders. See Kim Nguyen, Mothers Who Used Same Sperm Donor Meet, LAWRENCE
JOURNAL-WORLD (Aug. 11, 2006), https://www2.ljworld.com/news/2006/aug/12/mothers_
who_used_same_sperm_donor_meet/.
227. Pricing, XYTEX CRYO INT’L, https://www.xytex.com/patient-information/pricing/
(last visited July 25, 2019) (charging more expensive rates for patients to obtain premium
access to the company’s enhanced donor profiles to select their sperm donor).
228. Final Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Collins et al. v. Xytex Corp. et
al., No. 2015-cv-259033, 2015 WL 6387328 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2015).
229. But see CAHN, supra note 2.
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U.S.”230 Unable to procure sperm in their native Canada, Angela Collins and
her partner231 sought sperm from an American company, the Xytex Corporation of Georgia.232 Collins selected Xytex “because of its large, reportedly
high-quality donor selection233 and claims of rigorous screening.”234 In fact,
Xytex’s website boasted: “You can rest easy knowing right up front [that]
every Xytex donor ranks in the top 1% of the population in health and wellness.”235 Relying on these assertions,236 Ms. Collins selected the characteristics of the male genetic component of her hoped-for child. Like many women, Ms. Collins had several specifications in mind. Among them was high
intelligence.
Based on his profile, Ms. Collins chose the sperm of Donor 9623. His
profile, according to an archived copy located by an investigative journalist,237 stated he had an IQ of 160238 (ostensibly the same as Albert Einstein
and Stephen Hawking), bachelor’s and master’s degrees in neuroscience,
and was pursuing a Ph.D. He was advertised as an internationally acclaimed
drummer239 who spoke five languages and was an avid reader whose research interests included artificial intelligence. The profile also included a
six-page health questionnaire in which Donor 9623 specifically denied
schizophrenia or significant medical history. After selection, his sperm was
shipped from Xytex’s Atlanta office to Ontario where Collins was inseminated. She gave birth in July 2007.240

230. See Theresa Boyle, Sperm-Donor Shock Spurs Port Hope Couple’s Lawsuit, STAR
(Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.thestar.com/life/health_wellness/2015/04/06/sperm-donor-shockspurs-port-hope-couples-lawsuit.html.
231. Collins et al. v. Xytex Corp. et al., No. 2015-cv-259033, 2015 WL 6387328 (Ga.
Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2015).
232. Xytex Lawsuit: 3 Families Sue Sperm Bank Because Donor Allegedly Has Schizophrenia, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/04/15/xytex
-lawsuit_n_9702238.html.
233. Xytex claims that it selects only the top 5 percent of donor applicants. See Boyle,
supra note 230.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. In fact, Xytex does test for infectious diseases. The company says it requires a physical exam, psychological exam, completion of an extensive questionnaire that delves into
personal and family medical history, and genetic testing for a number of conditions, including
cystic fibrosis. However, it relies in large measure on questionnaires (like most sperm banks)
and does little if any independent verification donor. Id.
237. Id.
238. This is the highest possible score on a common form of the test, the WAIS-IV. What
is the WAIS-IV?, STRATEGIC PSYCHOLOGY, https://strategicpsychology.com.au/wais/ (last
visited on October 27, 2019).
239. Id.
240. Boyle, supra note 230; see also Collins et al. v. Xytex Corp. et al., No. 2015-cv259033, 2015 WL 6387328 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2015); see also Posada, supra note 160.
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An accidental release of an email in 2014 revealed the identity of Donor 9623 as James Christian “Chris” Aggeles. An internet search revealed
that Mr. Aggeles was no genius. In fact, he was at the time a college dropout, and his claims of being a burgeoning neuroscientist pursuing a Ph.D.
were entirely bogus. Nor was he an internationally acclaimed drummer. And
while his profile indicated he was “eloquent when he spoke,”241 the only
language he spoke was English. Nor was he a model citizen. Rather, he was
a convicted felon charged with burglary who served eight months in jail; the
remainder of the ten-year sentence was commuted.242 While Xytex bragged
that Mr. Aggeles “was their best donor”243 and especially good-looking, it
turned out they photo-shopped a mole off of his face.244 More serious was
his diagnosis of schizophrenia,245 a disease with a genetic component,246 and
that he suffered “significant grandiose delusions”247 along with bipolar and
narcissistic personality disorders.248 Most serious, though, was that Ms. Collins’ son was not the only child fathered by Mr. Aggeles. In violation of
established norms at least somewhat limiting dissemination, Xytex furnished
Donor 9623’s sperm to thirty-five other women249—that we know of.250

241. Boyle, supra note 230.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1.
246. See SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE GENE 442 (2016). The disease manifesting in
some cases in “young men who experienced a gradual but irreversible breakdown in their
cognitive abilities,” or “a terrifying form of cognitive disintegration—the collapse of thinking.” Id. at 441. “We know that there are at least 108 genes (or rather genetic regions) associated with schizophrenia—although we know the identity of only a handful of these culprits.”
Id. at 445.
247. See Christine Van Dusen, A Georgia Sperm Bank, a Troubled Donor, and the Secretive Business of Babymaking, ATLANTA (Feb. 13, 2018) https://www.atlantamagazine.com/
great-reads/georgia-sperm-bank-troubled-donor-secretive-business-babymaking/ (“A 2012
post on YouTube, reportedly by [Aggeles] . . . provided a vivid description of his symptoms.
‘The “hearing voices” is kind of hard to explain, but here goes: so I will be thinking something like, what I am going to make for dinner, and it’s like my thought gets interrupted by a
voice that tells me something that usually has nothing to do with what I was just thinking. Its
[sic] usually mean and will say things that are derogatory and demeaning to me. That, for me,
is the toughest part about being schizophrenic.’”).
248. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1.
249. Boyle, supra note 230.
250. See Yanan Wang, Couple Says Everything They Were Told About Their Sperm Donor Was a Lie, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ctsperm-donor-xytex-20160415-story.html (“Xytex told the Star that the donor’s sperm has
been used to conceive 36 children in Canada, the U.S., and the U.K.”). This does not take
into account that Mr. Aggeles may have supplied sperm to other sperm banks. Furthermore,
Xytex destroyed its own records at some point before Mr. Aggeles began supplying sperm.
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Angela Collins brought suit against Xytex alleging ten causes of action,251 only to see her complaint, and then her appeal, dismissed.252 Although she alleged, inter alia, fraud, products liability, and negligent misrepresentation, the court held that all claims boiled down to a “wrongful birth”
action which is not recognized in Georgia.253
The claim, however, is recognized in California, and that is where the
second claim against Xytex was filed. From this complaint, more facts
emerge.
2.

Doe v. Xytex Corp.

About a year after Judge McBurney dismissed Collins, the Jane Does
instituted their case against Xytex.254 Their complaint included more than
thirteen claims, including products liability, negligence, warranty, battery,
false advertising, wrongful birth, specific performance, and violation of the
California Unfair Competition law. In June of 2016, the action was removed
to Federal Court on diversity grounds.255 After several procedural tussles,256
discovery was continued at a court-ministered evidentiary hearing where
additional facts emerged, including the concerted effort by Xytex (via its
representative Mary Hartley) to induce Mr. Aggeles to puff up his background and (perhaps fraudulently257) seduce the plaintiffs into buying his
semen.258
The Does had contacted Xytex for reasons similar to Collins. Impressed by Xytex’s advertised status and screening procedures (“Xytex’s
251. Posada, supra note 160, at 850.
252. The appeal was dismissed on procedural grounds. Order to Dismiss, Collins et al. v.
Xytex Corp. et al., No. 2015-cv-259033, 2015 WL 6387328 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2015).
253. Kate Brumback, Judge Tosses Lawsuit Which Alleged Sperm Bank Misrepresented
Donor, AP NEWS (Oct. 21, 2015), https://apnews.com/1c40077649aa42c28cc0bcbc
6178d2d9.
254. Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. C 16-02935 WHA, 2017 WL 1112996, (N.D. Cal. Mar.
24, 2017).
255. Notice of Removal at 1:11-12, Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. C 16-02935 WHA, 2016
WL 3902577 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2016).
256. Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. C 16-02935 WHA, 2016 WL 7009226, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 1, 2016).
257. Joe Johnson, UGA Employee at Center of Sperm Bank Fraud Lawsuit, ATHENS
BANNER-HERALD (Sept. 3, 2016), https://www.onlineathens.com/mobile/2016-09-03/ugaemployee-center-sperm-bank-fraud-lawsuit (Mr. Aggeles actually turned himself in to the
Athens-Clarke County Police Department, “saying he committed fraud with Xytex and wanted to surrender.”).
258. See Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. C 16-02935, 2017 WL 1112996, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 24, 2017); see also Rebecca Tushnet, False Advertising of Sperm Donor Leads to
Wrongful Birth Claim, TUSHNET BLOG (Mar. 29, 2017), https://tushnet.com/2017/03/29/falseadvertising-of-sperm-donor-leads-to-wrongful-birth-claim/.

40

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

website declared that it is ‘an industry leader in reproductive services with a
commitment to unsurpassed quality controls’”259), they asked Xytex representative Hartley if she had a sperm donor with a particularly impressive
health and education history. In the prototypical “hard sell” Hartley
immediately singled out . . . Donor 9623, and stated that although Xytex
has not yet published his profile on their website, his sperm had already
been used to successfully inseminate women and it would be sold out as
soon as his profile was published . . . . ‘Moments after’ the phone conversation, Jane Doe One and Jane Doe Two purchased sperm from Donor 9623.260

The sperm was shipped from Georgia to San Francisco where Jane Doe One
was inseminated, giving birth in 2004.
We now learn that Donor 9623 first applied to Xytex sometime in late
2000 when he was a janitor/waiter after dropping out of school.261 During
Xytex’s “rigorous qualification procedure” (which consisted of no more
than filling out a questionnaire and undergoing a ten minute physical in
which medical and health histories were not taken), Mr. Aggeles “told Hartley that he thought his IQ was about 130, but Hartley “suggested that he was
a genius with an IQ of about 160.”262 Hartley further told him “that the more
educated donors did well selling their sperm, and that Xytex usually dealt
with donors with a higher education.”263 Since, at the time, Xytex was recruiting suppliers using unusually aggressive financial come-ons, and since
Hartley’s suggestion was accepted, we can postulate the pecuniary benefits
of increased sales influenced Mr. Aggeles’ revised application and inflation
of his intellectual prowess. It was this aggrandizement of intellectual capacities that induced the mothers in the reported lawsuits to purchase Donor
9623’s sperm.264
We also learn more details of Mr. Aggeles’ mental history: Prior to
selling his sperm to Xytex, not only had Mr. Aggeles been diagnosed with
psychotic schizophrenia, but he had been hospitalized for that condition on
259. Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. C 16-02935 WHA, 2017 WL 1112996, at *1 (N. D. Cal.
July 19, 2017).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Theresa Boyle, Sperm Bank Encouraged Mentally Ill Donor to Lie About IQ, Lawsuit Claims, SPEC (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.thespec.com/news-story/6505131-spermbank-encouraged-mentally-ill-donor-to-lie-about-iq-lawsuit-claims/; Van Dusen, supra note
247 (“Hartley says in a recording, which was made available . . . to curious customers, ‘I
could tell the genuineness from the very beginning . . . This guy—he’s the type that you
really strive to get.’”).
263. Id.
264. See Cha, supra note 50 (highlighting “a preference among many would-be parents
for tall, thin, highly-educated donors.”).
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at least two occasions—in one case for more than two weeks265—and that,
not surprisingly,266 he had been on complete social security disability for a
time.267
In March of 2017, the court declined to dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety and set the case for trial in November.268 Xytex took to the media and
denied wrongdoing. Its lawyer pointed to the Collins case, stating: “Xytex
looks forward to successfully defending itself from the new lawsuits with
the same results as the original case.”269 A month before the trial the case
settled,270 as did several similar cases271 around the country.272 This turn of
events, however, did not motivate Georgia courts to uncork its bar to suit. In
two recent cases, Zelt v. Xytex273 and Norman v. Xytex,274 the courts again
refused to countenance any deviation to the bar to wrongful birth/life cases.
3.

Zelt v. Xytex

In February 2018, Judge Thrash of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia dismissed Renee Zelt’s claims along the
same lines as did Judge McBurney in Collins. Noting Mr. Aggeles’ (unusually) remarkable rapid clearance to become a sperm supplier, the court also
remarked that Mr. Aggeles continued to supply sperm until 2016,275 before
denying recovery on the same grounds as Collins. Since previous reports
265. Tushnet, supra note 258.
266. Bipolar disorder and unemployment are common co-morbidities of schizophrenia.
See infra notes 309–32 and accompanying text.
267. Van Dusen, supra note 246 (“For years, Xytex had focused its advertising . . . eager
to tap into the willing cohort found on college campuses.”).
268. Id.
269. Ashifa Kassam, Sperm Bank Sued as Case of Mentally Ill Donor’s History Unfolds,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/14/sperm-donorcanada-families-file-lawsuit.
270. Xytex Settles Sperm Donor Case Before Trial Begins, SURROGACY L. CTR.,
https://www.surrogacy-lawyer.com/assisted-reproduction/xytex-settles-sperm-donor-casebefore-trial-begins/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
271. John Kennedy, Xytex Settles Claims Over Poorly Screened Sperm Donor, LAW360
(Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/978521/xytex-settles-claims-over-poorlyscreened-sperm-donor; see also Lindstrom, supra note 14.
272. Initially, some twenty-six lawsuits were filed against Xytex. As to the number settling, that appears unavailable; the settlements were sealed. See One of the Parents Explains
the Lawsuit. - Donor Sibling Registry, https://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/sites/default/
files/Angie%27s%20Letter.docx. In addition to the Doe case, the Collins case was also settled. Id.
273. See Zelt v. Xytex Corp., No. 1:17-CV-4851-TWT, 2018 WL 1014627 (N.D. Ga.
Feb. 22, 2018).
274. Norman v. Xytex Corp., 830 S.E.2d 267, 268 (Ga. App. 2019) (pet. for writ of certiorari filed in Ga. Sup. Ct., July 11, 2019).
275. Zelt, 2018 WL 1014627, at *1.
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indicated Mr. Aggeles stopped supplying in 2014,276 the significance of the
continued sperm supply until 2016 meant that data indicating he fathered
thirty-six children may be incomplete.
4.

Norman v. Xytex

The most recent matter in the Xytex Saga is Wendy Norman and Janet
Norman v. Xytex,277 decided by Judge McBurney, the same judge who decided Collins. While the injuries claimed in earlier cases can be said to be
either speculative or future-oriented, Norman v. Xytex takes us to the next
level: present and actual harm diagnosed in A.A., the offspring sired with
sperm of “our”278 Donor 9623.279 “A.A. has been diagnosed with Thalassemia Minor . . . .”280 A.A. also currently suffers from mental health issues
including “both suicidal and homicidal ideation, searching the internet for
ways to kill himself and his brother. A.A. has been hospitalized multiple
times for these issues. He is presently medicated with Lexapro, Kapvay and
Abilify.”281 Thus, “unlike previous Xytex litigation, . . . Plaintiffs can point
to actual, present harm that they and A.A. are enduring rather than the fear
of potential future physical and/or psychiatric issues.”282
While keeping certain windows open for reinstatement should the appellate court reverse his decision, Judge McBurney ruled the plaintiff’s
claims “except . . . specific performance” are all claims “for wrongful birth
camouflaged as some other tort” and dismissed the case.283 As of this writing, the case is on appeal.284
276. Boyle, supra note 230.
277. Norman v. Xytex Corp., 830 S.E.2d 267, 268 (Ga. App. 2019) (pet. for writ of certiorari filed in Ga. Sup. Ct., July 11, 2019).
278. Judge Alsup’s sympathy to the plaintiffs in Doe v. Xytex was patently obvious in his
reference to the plaintiff as “our plaintiff.” No. C 16-02935 WHA, 2016 WL 7009226, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2016).
279. Hasmik Djoulakian, The “Outing” of Sperm Donor 9623, CTR. GENETICS & SOC’Y
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.geneticsandsociety.org/biopolitical-times/outing-sperm-donor9623. Djoulakian laments the coupling of Mr. Aggeles’ schizophrenia diagnosis with his poor
educational attainment and criminal history. He claims that by including both in the same
indictment against Xytex, the insinuation that schizophrenia is causally related is being conveyed. However, a well-documented linkage of criminality with schizophrenia does exist, and
while the disease itself might not “cause” criminality, inability to hold down a job and other
lifestyle effects of the disease may be influential. See infra notes 297–98 and accompanying
text.
280. Norman v. Xytex Corp., No. 2017 CV 298536, 1, 5 n.10 (Sup. Ct. Ga. June 13,
2018).
281. Id.
282. Norman v. Xytex Corp., No. 2017 CV 298536, 1, 5 (Sup. Ct. Ga. June 13, 2018).
283. Id.
284. Norman v. Xytex Corp., 830 S.E.2d 267, 268 (Ga. App. 2019) (pet. for writ of certiorari filed in Ga. Sup. Ct., July 11, 2019).
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Among damages sought by the Normans are medical monitoring and
damages for emotional distress and fear. To understand whether such claims
are reasonable and to set the stage for repurposing the public nuisance claim
in the context of sperm bank malfeasance, an examination of both schizophrenia and thalassemia minor is warranted.
B.

Medical Implications of the Greater Harms: Personal Injury
1.

Thalassemia Minor

Thalassemia minor is an inherited (autosomal recessive) disease resulting in defective production of hemoglobin, which closely resembles mild
iron-deficiency anemia.285 It is caused by mutation of a single gene,286 meaning all cases are inherited and there is no environmental component.287 It is
simple to screen for.288
Since Wendy Norman does not carry the thalassemia gene, we know
that Mr. Aggeles was the contributor. Because the disease is mild, it is unlikely children would be tested or come to know they were carriers. However, should a child marry someone similarly afflicted, the odds are higher
their child will suffer more severe variants.289 From a population (public
health) standpoint, testing of Mr. Aggeles’ children is surely warranted.290
2.

Schizophrenia

While thalassemia minor is an actual condition affecting the Normans’
child, it is minor. Schizophrenia, however, is a more immediate, severe, and
pressing concern that normally manifests in the teens or young adulthood.291
The thirty-six families who used Mr. Aggeles’ sperm will worry for a decade or two before learning if their child is affected, not a generation.

285. Beta Thalassemia, MED. NET, https://www.medicinenet.com/beta_thalassemia/
article.htm#what_is_the_difference_between_thalassemia_minor_and_major (last visited
July 13, 2019).
286. NAT’L ACADS. PRESS, IMPROVING BIRTH OUTCOMES: MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF
THE DEVELOPING WORLD 241 (Judith R. Bale et al. eds., 2003), https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/books/NBK222097/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK222097.pdf.
287. DENNIS ALEXANDER, GENES, DETERMINISM AND GOD (2018).
288. See MUKHERJEE, supra note 246.
289. Id.
290. Elham Ahmadnezhad et al., Evaluation and Cost Analysis of National Health Policy
of Thalassemia Screening in West-Azerbaijan Province of Iran, 3 J. PREVENTATIVE MED.
687–92 (2012).
291. Schizophrenia, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/
topics/schizophrenia/index.shtml (last visited July 13, 2019).
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Schizophrenia is a chronic and severe mental disorder that affects
how a person thinks, feels, and behaves. People with schizophrenia may
seem like they have lost touch with reality . . . . 292 The disease presents
with positive symptoms (delusions, hallucinations, incoherent speech,
and disorganized thinking) and/or negative (restricted affect, empty
speech content, decreased motivation, and social withdrawal) symptoms.293 [S]ymptoms also include movement disorders (agitated body
movements), difficulty beginning and sustaining activities, poor “executive functioning” (the ability to understand information and use it to
make decisions), trouble focusing or paying attention, and problems with
“working memory” (the ability to use information immediately after
learning it). 294 People with schizophrenia are prone to additional mental
health problems such as depression (which occurs in half the patients),
substance-use disorders and anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders.295 An increased prevalence of panic disorder has been found in
first-degree relatives of patients with schizophrenia. 296 Patients with
schizophrenia also may be at increased risk for exposure to trauma.297

Schizophrenics die at a younger age than the general population by
around twenty-five years298 due to other co-occurring medical conditions,
such as heart disease, liver disease, and diabetes,299 and an excess suicide
rate over baseline,300 accounting for about twenty thousand deaths worldwide.301 Attempted suicide is also more common: 20–40% of schizophrenics
292. Id.
293. But see I-Jun Chou et al., Familial Aggregation and Heritability of Schizophrenia
and Co-aggregation of Psychiatric Illnesses in Affected Families, 43 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL.
1070, 1071 (2017).
294. NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 291.
295. Isabela M. Lucka et al., Prodromal Symptoms of Schizophrenics Syndrome in Children and Adolescent, 36 PSYCHIATRY POL’Y 283, 283 (2002).
296. Peter F. Buckley et al., Psychiatric Comorbidities and Schizophrenia, 35
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 383, 385 (2008).
297. Craig Morgan & Helen Fisher, Environment and Schizophrenia: Environmental
Factors in Schizophrenia: Childhood Trauma—A Critical Review, 33 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL.
3, 7 (2007).
298. Mark Wolfson et al., Premature Mortality Among Adults with Schizophrenia in the
United States, 72 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 1172, 1172 (2015); Thomas. M. Laursen et al., Life
Expectancy and Cardiovascular Mortality in Persons with Schizophrenia, 25 CURRENT
OPINION PSYCHIATRY 83, 83 (2012).
299. Id.
300. Brian A. Palmer et al., The Lifetime Risk of Suicide in Schizophrenia: A Reexamination, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 247, 247 (2005); see also Jim van Os & Shitij Kapur,
Schizophrenia, 374 LANCET 635, 635 (2009).
301. Haidong Wang et al., Global, Regional, and National Life Expectancy, All-Cause
Mortality, and Cause-Specific Mortality for 249 Causes of Death, 1980–2015: A Systematic
Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015, 388 LANCET 1459, 1488 (2016). In
2013, an estimated 24 million cases were reported globally. See Theo Vos et al., Global,
Regional, and National Incidence, Prevalence, and Years Lived With Disability for 301 Acute
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attempt suicide at least once.302 Some 10% of convicted murderers have
schizophrenia,303and at least one study found that 8–10% of schizophrenics
had committed a violent act in the past year—four times higher than the
general population.304 In addition, people with schizophrenia are stigmatized
as being more violent (whether they are or not), a perception which has
more than doubled since the 1950s.305
C.

Genetic Implications of the Greater Harms: A Population Harm

“Schizophrenia definitely has a very significant genetic component.”306
While certainly not all cases are genetically caused, the best research concludes the disease is 80 percent heritable.307 (Although some say heredity
and environment are each 50 percent contributory).308
It is generally accepted that children of a parent with schizophrenia
have an elevated risk above population baseline. Some say it is more than
ten-fold, others say even higher.309 One conservative estimate put the risk at

and Chronic Diseases and Injuries in 188 countries, 1990-2013: A Systematic Analysis for
the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013, 386 LANCET 743 (2015); Schizophrenia, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/mental_health/management/schizophrenia/en/ (last visited June 22, 2019).
302. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, 101–05 (5th ed. 2013); see also Andreas Carlborg et al., Suicide in Schizophrenia, 10 EXPERT REV. NEUROTHERAPEUTICS, 1156 (2010).
303. 1000 Homicides by Mentally Ill, MENTAL ILLNESS POLICY ORG.,
https://mentalillnesspolicy.org/consequences/1000-homicides.html (noting that “[a] 2011
study suggests that state homicide rates are correlated to the state’s civil commitment laws,
i.e., states that make it easier to treat people with mental illness have lower homicide rates”);
see also Alexandre Martins Valença & Talvane Marins de Moraes, Relationship Between
Homicide and Mental Disorders, 28 REV. BRAZ. PSIQUIATRIA S62, S63–S64 (2006).
304. Valença & de Moraes, supra note 303.
305. Jo C. Phelan et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness in 1950 and 1996: What Is
Mental Illness and Is It to Be Feared?, 41 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 188, 188, 197 (2000).
306. Heredity
and
the
Genetics
of
Schizophrenia, SCHIZOPHRENIA.COM,
http://www.schizophrenia.com/research/hereditygen.htm (last visited on September 17,
2019); see also ROBERT PLOMIN, BLUEPRINT: HOW DNA MAKES US WHO WE ARE, vii, x, 5
(2018) (where one researcher claims that every psychological disease has a genetic component).
307. Twin Study Pins Nearly 80% of Schizophrenia on Heritability, NEUROSCIENCE NEWS
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://neurosciencenews.com/schizophrenia-heritability-7672/; see also
Rikke Hilker et al., Heritability of Schizophrenia and Schizophrenia Spectrum Based on the
Nationwide Danish Twin Register, 83 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 492, 495 (2017); Dennis R.
Combs et al., Chapter 8: Schizophrenia: Etiological Considerations, in M HERSEN AND D.C.
BEIDEL, ADULT PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND DIAGNOSIS 234, 257 (6th ed. 2011).
308. See Chou et al., supra note 293.
309. See Heredity and the Genetics of Schizophrenia, SCHIZOPHRENIA.COM,
http://www.schizophrenia.com/research/hereditygen.htm (last visited July 14, 2019).
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six-fold increase over baseline;310 others say the “risk goes up to 12 percent.”311 To evaluate the actual consequences, identifying the baseline level
is paramount; in other words, ten times more than what? Is this a rare disease, in which case 10 percent over baseline may be undetectable, or a relatively common one?
In fact, schizophrenia is not uncommon. The incidence in the general
population is said to be 1 percent,312 or one per hundred live births. Thus, in
a population of a hundred people where children have one schizophrenic
parent, we should expect twelve cases—and if a father has thirty-six children, we expect four cases instead of none to one.313 If one of Mr. Aggeles’
children carries schizophrenia-inducing gene(s) and marries someone else
with similar gene(s), the risk trebles. Thus we have the “shocking” statistic
“that if both of your parents have schizophrenia, the risk increases to 39
percent.”314 Additionally, a 1.62-fold risk of other mood disorders (including
bipolar disorder)315 has been reported in offspring of schizophrenic parents.
One-third of these children “may develop severe mental illness by early
adulthood.”316
Approximately ten gene variations are linked to schizophrenia317 and
defects in certain genes may be especially determinative of disease onset.
310. Id.; see also Chou et al., supra note 293.
311. See Tim B. Bigdeli et al., Genome-Wide Association Study Reveals Greater Polygenic Loading for Schizophrenia in Cases with a Family History of Illness, 171
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC GENETICS 276, 278–79 (2016); Elliot Rees et al., Genetics of Schizophrenia, 2 CURRENT OPINION BEHAV. SCI. 8, 9 (2015); see cf. ALEXANDER, supra note 287, at 170
(asserting the risk is nine times over background).
312. Heinz Häfner, Review Article: The Concept of Schizophrenia: From Unity to Diversity, 2014 ADVANCES IN PSYCHIATRY 1 (2014) (“Multiple formal genetic studies have demonstrated the contribution of genetic factors to schizophrenia risk. The lifetime schizophrenia
risk of first-degree relatives shows a 5–10-fold increase compared to that observed in the
general population (lifetime prevalence 1%).”).
313. Johnson, supra note 257. Of Mr. Aggeles’ thirty-six children (in twenty-six families), seventeen were girls, nineteen were boys, following the normal statistical pattern. There
is no reason to believe the heredity pattern of schizophrenia would be different.
314. Pablo V. Ghejman et al., The Role of Genetics in the Etiology of Schizophrenia, 33
PSYCHIATRY CLINICAL N. AM. 35, 35–66 (2010).
315. Nick Craddock & Michael J. Owen, The Kraepelinian Dichotomy—Going, Going . . . But Still Not Gone, 196 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 92, 92–95 (2010).
316. See Chou et al., supra note 293, at 1071; Daniel Rasic et al., Risk of mental illness in
offspring of parents with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder: a
meta-analysis of family high-risk studies, 40 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 28 (2014); Fritz Mattejat
& Helmut Remschmidt, The Children of Mentally Ill Parents, 105 DUETSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT
INT. 413 (2008). A risk of 1.62 means there is a 62% chance the child will develop the disease—a figure higher than the 51% chance commonly associated with the more probable than
not rubric.
317. But see MUKHERJEE, supra note at 246 (noting 108 genes or genetic regions are
associated with schizophrenia).
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Chromosome 22, for example, has been linked to a near-doubled risk of
disease.318 Around 5 percent of cases are due to other genetic variations319
which may increase the risk of developing the disorder by as much as twenty-fold.320
As with thalassemia, the severity of schizophrenia exacerbates over
successive generations. Thus, from a societal standpoint more important
than the impact on Mr. Aggeles’ children is the impact of a schizophreniagenetic component on their children. This phenomenon, known as anticipation, appears as an “increasing severity or earlier age on onset . . . across
successive generations. Diseases such as . . . fragile X syndrome have . . .
been shown to exhibit anticipation . . . [and it] has been demonstrated in
families with . . . schizophrenia.”321 Simply stated, then, both diseases worsen over generations.
D.

Economic Implication of Greater Harms: Public Health Costs

The impact of genetics and genomics on public health is wellrecognized.322 This includes considerations of behavioral and environmental
interventions to reduce risk, and examination of cost-effectiveness of a
broad range of clinical and environmental interventions.323 In the case of
schizophrenia, for example, the public health burdens also include considerations of lost productivity, criminal justice involvement, social service
needs, and other factors beyond actual health care for those with the disease.324
Financial costs associated with schizophrenia are disproportionately
high325 and the societal economic burden of the disease is heavy. 326 Schizo318. Schizophrenia Is Hereditary, but Only to a Certain Degree, MERCOLA TAKE
CONTROL OF YOUR HEALTH, https://articles.mercola.com/schizophrenia/hereditary.aspx (last
visited October 28, 2019).
319. Chelsea Lowther et al., Genomic Disorders in Psychiatry—What Does the Clinician
Need to Know?, 19 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REP. 82 (2017).
320. Heredity and the Genetics of Schizophrenia, SCHIZOPHRENIA.COM,
http://www.schizophrenia.com/research/hereditygen.htm (last visited June 24, 2019) (“[F]irst
degree relatives have an incidence of schizophrenia an order of magnitude higher than the
general populace [(20 % v. 10 %)].”).
321. Id.; see also What Do Geneticists Mean by Anticipation?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED.
(June 11, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/inheritance/anticipation.
322. See Ridgely F. Green et al., Evaluating the Role of Public Health in Implementation
of Genomics-Related Recommendations: A Case Study of Hereditary Cancers Using the CDC
Science Impact Framework, 21 GENETICS MED. 28 (2018).
323. INST. MED. (US) COMM. GENOMICS & PUB.’S HEALTH 21ST CENTURY, IMPLICATIONS
OF GENOMICS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH: WORKSHOP SUMMARY (Lyla M. Hernandez, ed., 2005).
324. Schizophrenia, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/
topics/schizophrenia/index.shtml (last visited July 13, 2019).
325. Id.
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phrenia is one of the top fifteen causes for disability worldwide327 and active
schizophrenic psychosis ranked the third-most-disabling condition after
quadriplegia and dementia (worse than paraplegia and blindness).328 Some
50 percent of schizophrenics have chronic lifelong impairment329 often accompanied by long-term unemployment, poverty, and homelessness.330
About 85 percent are unemployed331 and approximately three-fourths of
schizophrenics have ongoing disability with relapses.332 In the United States,
the financial cost of schizophrenia—including direct costs (outpatient, inpatient, drugs, and long-term care) and non-health care costs (law enforcement, reduced workplace productivity, and unemployment)—was estimated
as $62.7 billion in 2002,333 ballooning to $155 billion in 2013, more than
doubling in a decade.334 Per individual, this translates into a cost of almost
$100,000 per patient.335

326. van Os, supra note 300, at 635.
327. Global, Regional, and National Incidence, Prevalence, and Years Lived with Disability for 328 Diseases and Injuries for 195 Countries, 1990–2016: A Systematic Analysis for
the Global Burden of Disease Study, 390 LANCET 1211, 1231 (2017); see also Marco M.
Picchioni & Robin M. Murray, Schizophrenia, 335 BRIT. MED. J. 91 (2007).
328. T. Bedirhan Ustün et al., Multiple-Informant Ranking of the Disabling Effects of
Different Health Conditions in 14 Countries, 354 LANCET 111, 111 (1999).
329. Ryan E. Lawrence et al., “Schizophrenia and Other Psychoses,” in PSYCHIATRY,
798, 816, 819 (Allan Tasman ed., 4th ed. 2015).
330. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 302, at 101–105.
331. Michael J. Owen et al., Schizophrenia, 388 LANCET 86, 86 (2016).
332. Thomas Smith et al., Schizophrenia (Maintenance Treatment), 82 AM. FAM.
PHYSICIAN 338, 338 (2010).
333. See Eric Q. Wu et al., The Economic Burden of Schizophrenia in the United States in
2002, 66 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1122, 1125 (2005).
334. Economic Burden of Schizophrenia in the U.S. Exceeded $155 Billion in 2013, New
Study Funds, HEALTH CARE BULLETIN, https://www.analysisgroup.com/Insights/agfeature/health-care-bulletin/fall-2016/economic-burden (last visited June 24, 2019) (citing
Eric We et al., J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (2016)).
335. “About 100,000 people in the United States will be diagnosed with schizophrenia in
2015 [about 1.1% of adults the United States]. The 12-month prevalence . . . in the USA in
2002 was estimated at 5.1 per 1000 lives.” See E.Q. Wu et al., Annual Prevalence of Diagnosed Schizophrenia in the USA: A Claims Data Analysis Approach, 36 PSYCHOL. MED.
1535, 1535 (2006). Given that 1.5 million cases divided by 62 billion dollars = $41,000 each
in 2002, or at 1.5 million cases per $1.55 billion, about $100,000 per patient in 2013.
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Chart 2: Economic Burden of Schizophrenia.336

The negative impacts of sperm bank errors, then, can far transcend
those to the individual. The consequent impact on society includes both genetic effects on the population gene pool and economic impacts on public
health, including costs of intervention. These harms affect all of us.
V. PRIVATE USE OF PUBLIC NUISANCE: THE LEGAL IMPERATIVE
In this part, I discuss the legal background for nuisance theory and provide the basis for its novel use in the context of sperm bank errors. I also
provide a harm-driven predicate for this approach. This harm-driven approach enlarges the eligible class of plaintiffs, expands the scope of recovery, and allows for punitive damages—thereby producing a deterrent effect
in addition to providing compensatory relief and therapeutic justice.

336. Economic Burden of Schizophrenia in the US Exceeded $155 Billion in 2013, New
Study Finds, ANALYSIS GROUP, http://www.analysisgroup.com/economic-burdenschizophrenia-in-us/ (last visited June 15, 2019).
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The Public Nuisance Claim for Damaging the Genetic Ecology

Individual children fathered by Mr. Aggeles have an increased risk of
schizophrenia at levels somewhere between ten and twenty-fold over background. As far as the population is concerned, we will bear the costs of caring for between four and eight schizophrenics who would not otherwise
have been born, but for Xytex’s actions. That is what happens when someone with this genetic profile fathers thirty-six children—but when men who
bear a gene for a similar heritable condition father one hundred or six hundred337 or eight hundred338 or perhaps one thousand339 children—what becomes the population burden then?
In the Xytex cases, investigating public (criminal) records and verifying
entries on Mr. Aggeles’ application (e.g., employment) might have disclosed
facts rendering him ineligible to supply sperm, obviating the resultant thirtysix (or more) pregnancies.340 The failure to perform routine background
checks and verifications or require psychological evaluation (e.g., screening
techniques used by matchmaking agencies or educational institutions)
should be sufficient to establish claims for negligence. However, under current law, such claims would be rejected as falling under the wrongful life or
wrongful birth rubric. Even assuming such a claim could survive, it cannot
be applied when malfeasance is not the cause of the harm.
Thus, what if the sperm supplier doesn’t have a criminal record or is
not aware of genetic anomalies he carries? How else would you prevent
someone from providing unhealthy sperm? The knee-jerk response is to
require genetic testing. Simply stated, this just isn’t feasible for many genetic diseases—at least for now. As of 2003, approximately nine hundred
available genetic tests were on the market;341 today there are some two thousand,342 some requiring expensive karyotyping.343 In the future, costs are
337. Smith, supra note 120.
338. Crocker, supra note 121.
339. Cook, supra note 213.
340. In Doe 1 v. Xytex, Judge William Alsup wrote, “If Xytex had screened Donor 9623
as carefully as claimed . . . he likely would have been rejected.” No. C 16-02935 WHA, 2017
WL 1112996, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2017); see also Lindstrom, supra note 14.
341. See Francis S. Collins, A Brief Primer on Genetic Testing, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME
RES. INST. (Jan. 24, 2003), https://www.genome.gov/10506784/a-brief-primer-on-genetictesting; see also Genetic Testing FAQ, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/FAQ/Genetic-Testing (last visited June 15, 2019).
342. Genetic Testing: How It Is Used for Healthcare, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., https://report.nih.gov/NIHfactsheets/ViewFactSheet.aspx?csid=43 (last visited June
15, 2019).
343. Ellen E. Write, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians
for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1493 n.21 (1978); see also William
G. Johnson et al., Artificial Insemination by Donors: The Need for Genetic Screening, 304
NEW ENG. J. MED. 755, 776 (1981).
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predicted to decline, and eventually sequencing an individual’s entire genome will cost less than $1,000.344 At that point, the standard of care may
change, but it may be decades before genetic interactions can be fully assessed. For now, in most cases, blanket testing is plainly not feasible.
Feasibility is a cornerstone of negligence.345 As stated above, rigorous
criminal checks and a detailed history of a non-anonymous donor (who
would be less tempted to lie) might prevent some of the calamities. But far
from all. The mere possibility that one genetically impaired individual
would sire hundreds of children and introduce heritable diseases into the
gene pool at perhaps ten times over background, which increase in severity
over generations, demands redress. That technological advances (e.g.,
IVF/ART technologies) caused these problems highlights the importance of
the legal community considering the implications of scientific advances
from the get-go. This means that addressing the resultant problems generated by these advances requires a multi-pronged approach, including redress
to compensate victims, removing or reducing the onus on the public social
welfare system, creating tax structures for caring for such children, and ultimately forcing the sperm bank industry to cut profits and siphon some of it
into better screening/monitoring mechanisms. And if the current legal system has no means of redress, “in the absence of statutory law . . . we must
innovate.”346
Innovation in tort law is not new, although the Xytex judges seem
oblivious. As Justice Cardozo noted: “[i]nnovate, however, to some extent
[the judge] must, for with new conditions there must be new rules.”347 At
least one court noted that “[t]he law of negligence was created by common
law judges and therefore unavoidably the Court’s responsibility [is] to continue to develop or limit the development of that body of law absent legislative direction.”348 Lack of precedent cannot absolve a common law court for
not developing the law.349 However, rather than create an entirely new claim,
I suggest that a new use for an old tort—one which excludes the requirement
of foreseeability—might be more workable, or at the very least more acceptable and easily implementable.
In this regard, I propose the claim of public nuisance as an appropriate
remedy to redress the greater harms created by sperm banks, e.g., those
344. NIH Genetic Testing: How It Is Used for Healthcare, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERS. (2010), https://report.nih.gov/NIHfactsheets/ViewFactSheet.aspx?csid=43.
345. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 132, Westlaw (database updated August 2019)
(“[A]n act or omission is generally not negligent which can only be done or prevented by . . .
the expenditure of extraordinary sums of money . . . .”).
346. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 137 (Yale, 1921).
347. Id.
348. Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 764 (1977).
349. See Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 425 (1981).
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which introduce a genetic anomaly into the population gene pool over background levels. Such acts infringe on the public health by tampering with
evolutionary biology and interfering with the gene pool. In other words,
sperm bank activity that creates genetically impaired children impairs the
public health by invading a right to protection of the genetic ecology. Additionally, these problems tax the economics of public health by increasing
societal costs needed to deal with medically induced problems.
Public nuisance also may be appropriate to address instances of
switched embryos which generate harms that tax society’s resources, such as
custody battles350 requiring court intervention.351 Under public nuisance theory, the resultant child would also be able to sue352—as the child is not suing
over her or his life or its quality, but merely rights to be enjoyed by all:353
the freedom to parent (and select a co-parent), the freedom to be free from
genetic tampering, and the right to protection of the genetic ecology. This
claim will broaden the class of plaintiffs eligible to sue and enlarge recovery
available and will be discussed in Section D. In the next section, I first explore the rudiments of the claim before delving into the relevant history.354
B.

The Basis: Definitions, History, and Requirements
There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that
which surrounds the word “nuisance.” It has meant all things to all people and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming
advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie. There is general agreement
that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition. 355

The historical underpinnings of the cause of action, however, are welldocumented356 and establish its relevance to the matter at hand. In the begin350. Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 276 A.D.2d 67 (N.Y. 2000).
351. The issue of “whose child am I?”, especially where two sets of parents claim custody, may constitute a serious violation on the right to family—or at least the sanctity of family
life, a basic tenet of many religions and cultures. See Raziel Liebler, Are You My Parent? Are
You My Child? The Role of Genetics and Race in Defining Relationships After Reproductive
Technological Mistakes, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 15 (2002).
352. Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Haw. 1982) (“[W]e believe it is unjust
to deny members of the public the ability to enforce the public’s rights when they are injured.”).
353. See infra note 358 and accompanying text; see also Russo, supra note 25.
354. See David R. Hodas, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law Citizen
Suits for Relief from Environmental Harm, 16 ECOLOGY L. Q. 883 (1989).
355. W. PAGE PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS (5th ed. 1984), n. 34,
1004; see id. § 86, 616; see also 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances §§ 20–21 (1984); see also State v.
Davis, 333 P.2d 613, 616 (N.M. 1958).
356. See generally William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L.
REV. 997 (1966).
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ning, private nuisances that hindered public goods were considered a public
nuisance, indictable as a misdemeanor.357 Initially, the public goods in question were waterways; in our case, it is the gene pool.
Simply put, the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines public nuisance
as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.”358 An “unreasonable interference” includes conduct involving “a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace,
the public comfort or the public convenience;” or conduct “of a continuing
nature” or which had “produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as
the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.”359 The Restatement (Second) of Torts modernizes public nuisance
doctrine by classifying a greater variety of unreasonable acts as public nuisances and establishing that a violation of property rights is no longer necessary.360 Hence, tampering with the gene pool should be actionable under this
theory.361
The legal focus of recent developments has shifted to examining
whether the plaintiff was in fact injured,362 and the “particular damage” rule
has been broadened beyond physical injury363 or pecuniary loss.364 Today,
the claimant must only “‘show that he personally has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant’ and that the injury . . . ‘fairly can be traced to the challenged action’”365 and that the damage is severe.366

357. See TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE, THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 11–14, 41, 70, 73–79 (2004).
358. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
359. Id.
360. E.g., City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 12 Mass. L. Rep. 225, 234 (2000)
(an action against firearms manufacturers, distributors, sellers and promoters); see Note,
Recovering the Costs of Public Nuisance Abatement: The Public and Private City Sue the
Gun Industry, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1529 (2000); see also LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN &
LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 243 (2016); In re Starlink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
361. Armory Park v. Episcopal Comm. Servs., 712 P.2d 914, 917 (Ariz. 1985).
362. See Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the
Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755 (2001).
363. Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986) (“The court
defined an injury-in-fact as a personal injury to a recognized interest . . . caused by . . . inconvenience, annoyance, or discomfort.”); see Keating, supra note 24; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
364. Stop & Shop v. Fisher, 444 N.E.2d 368, 373 (1983).
365. Mandy Garrells, Raising Environmental Justice Claims Through the Law of Public
Nuisance, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 178 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
366. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986) (emphasis added).
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The amorphous definition associated with the term allows the tort to be
refashioned into one that addresses current problems—and indeed its use
has been expanded, first to environmental harms,367 then to tobacco, and
finally (and perhaps most closely aligned) to the opioid epidemic.368 In fact,
the broad tentacles of the claim have been espoused by Professor Keating,
who asserts that negligence is not a prerequisite for recovery,369 thereby cutting off at the knees the argument of infeasibility of genetic testing.
A brief foray into the origins of the doctrine provides even greater support for its use to redress sperm bank errors.370 If we consider the famous
example of Hale’s Case371 we start to paint a vivid picture of the wide scope
of the tort at its nascence: a tort that put health as a cornerstone of actionability.372
The theory arose in 1536 where a court used language strangely reminiscent of harms created by the profitable sperm bank industry: “[W]here
one man has greater hurt or inconvenience than any other man had . . . then
he who had more displeasure or hurt, etc., can have an action to recover his
damages that he had by reason of this special hurt.”373 While initially nuisance theory derived from protection of property interests, the real driver
was the intent to provide security under the law.374 Concerns for physical
well-being, entrenched as necessities of habitation, were hence actionable.375
Public health developments during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and
eighteenth centuries broadened the notion. As Blackstone succinctly put it, a
nuisance is “anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience or damage.”376
Blackstone’s definition tracks with its American counterpart defining nuisance as “the doing or failure to do something that affects the safety, health
or morals of the public or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience

367. Is the Public Nuisance Universe Expanding?, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://perma.cc/W2WF-CTJX.
368. See infra notes 374–75 and accompanying text.
369. Keating, supra note 24, at 5.
370. Russo, supra note 25, at 1976.
371. JOHN H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE
LAW TO 1750, at 592–93 (1986); see also Wiseman v. Denham, 81 Eng. Rep. 1114 (involving
moldy cheese); see Robert Charles Palmer, Modern Nuisance Law from a Historical Perspective 124 n.446 (Feb. 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of the West of England), http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/26153/1/Thesis%20-%20repository%20version.pdf.
372. Palmer, supra note 371, at 124.
373. Hodas, supra note 354, at 884 (quoting anonymous case 3 Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f.
26, pl. 10 (1536)).
374. Palmer, supra note 371, at 251.
375. Aldred’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 816; 9 Co. Rep. 57, 57; BAKER & MILSOM,
supra note 371, at 599.
376. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *214; see also Palmer, supra note 371, at
137.
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or injury to the public.”377 In the nineteenth century, judges spoke of guarding the “comfort of physical existence” on property as essential to the theory
of nuisance law that traditionally regarded bodily security as a protected
interest.378 In essence, “‘home’ is the place where the conditions for the biology and chemistry which enables our physical being to function properly
are present.”379
The early twentieth century took the doctrine further. Roscoe Pound
(1870-1964, who had a PhD in science as well as being a lawyer and legal
academic),380 considered the five natural interests of the physical person as
worthy of protection. Among those was protection of the body from direct
or indirect injury, maintenance of bodily health, and protection from direct
or indirect injury of one’s mental health. Thus, Pound identifies human beings’ natural desire to strive for freedom from annoyance which interferes
with not just physical comfort but also mental poise, as furnishing a basis
for the tort.381 At common law, this rule applied to traumatic injuries. It now
has been expanded to toxic torts.382
Lessons from environmental nuisance claims support its use in the IVF
or sperm bank context.383 “[S]o long as there is an unreasonable interference
with the public health, there is nothing that requires a public nuisance claim
to arise from pollution or other land-based interferences.”384 Pollution, then,
is a generic term, not necessarily originating in land. It can be defined as the
presence or introduction into the environment of a substance or thing that
has harmful or poisonous effects. “[P]ollution . . . is always unlawful and, in
itself constitutes a nuisance.”385 Threats posed by pollution,386 especially

377. Commonwealth v. S. Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 205 S.W. 581, 583 (Ky.
1918).
378. EMILY COCKAYNE, HUBBUB: FILTH, NOISE & STENCH IN ENGLAND 1600–1770 (Yale
University Press 2007); see also Palmer, supra note 371, at 113.
379. Palmer, supra note 371, at 115.
380. Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Case Studies in Scientific Statecraft: The Science of Aaron
Aaronson and Its Influence on Justice Louis Brandeis, PROC. POLICY STUDIES ORG. (2015).
381. Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 355–56 (1915).
382. See Hodas, supra note 354.
383. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 550–51 (2006).
384. Richard A. Fogel, Recent Uptick in Public Nuisance Claim Filings Could Indicate
Broader Trend, (April 20, 2017) https://www.rfogellaw.com/recent-uptick-in-publicnuisance-claim-filings-could-indicate-broader-trend/.
385. See Palmer, supra 371, at 157.
386. See Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, State of Nature Theory, and Environmental
Protection, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 15 (2009) (discussing the modern uses of nuisance in
environmental law and the connections with property law); see also Joseph H. Guth, Law for
the Ecological Age, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 431, 435 (2008).
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those impacting public health,387 were held actionable on the basis that a
polluter should not escape liability.388 The “Pruitt Rule” further extended the
concept, noting that the doctrine “compensates innocent plaintiffs and imposes the costs of harm on those who caused it.”389 With this in mind, surely
it can be said that implanting sperm with genetic defects which “infects”390
the embryo is a form of pollution. And shouldn’t a sperm bank that “pollutes” the gene pool be held to the same standard as those who pollute natural resources? In fact, the driving forces behind developments of nuisance
law followed the Black Death and were imposed to “coerce people to accept
responsibility and thus preserve society.”391
The nuisance claim also assists us in dealing with the lack of foreseeability incident to some genetic errors, as nuisance can be said to be a “strict
liability” claim. The concept of “strict liability in nuisance”392 differs from
strict liability in tort393 as the “defendant can be liable for causing a nuisance
if the defendant intentionally causes it, negligently causes it, or (in limited
circumstances) causes it in abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous activities.”394 Further, lack of foreseeability “is not the least fatal to a finding of
the existence of a common law public nuisance.”395 Hence, “[a] nuisance
exists because it is a violation of an absolute duty [not to endanger]396 so that
it does not rest on the degree of care used but rather on the degree of danger

387. Complaint, Port of Portland v. Monsanto Co., No. 3:17-cv-00015-MO, 2017 WL
57777 (D. Or. 2017).
388. Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973), aff’d, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st
Cir. 1977) (“The concept of responsibility for ‘pollution’ transcends chemical discharges,
such as when a hog sty was determined to have ‘corrupted’ and ‘infected the air.’”); see Aldred’s Case (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 817; 9 Co. Rep. 57, 57.
389. Louisiana ex. rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (Wisdom,
J., dissenting) (following the reasoning set out in Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp.
975 (E.D. Va. 1981)).
390. See Aldred’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817; 9 Co. Rep. at 58; Russo, supra note 25, at
1983.
391. See Palmer, supra note 371, at 177, 228 nn. 658, 660.
392. Miles v. Forest Rock Granite Co. (Leicestershire) Ltd. (1918) 34 TLR 500, 533; see
also J. R. Spencer, Public Nuisance—A Critical Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55, 59
(1989).
393. Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061 (2009).
394. Martins v. Interstate Power Co., No. 00-0791, 2002 WL 534890, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Apr. 10, 2002).
395. Louise A. Halper, Public Nuisance and Public Plaintiffs: Rediscovering the Common Law (Part I), 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10292 (1986); Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.,
319 A.2d 871, 873 (Pa. 1974).
396. Benson v. Loehler, 178 A.2d 909, 909 (Md. 1962); cf. Jill M. Fraley, Liability for
Unintentional Nuisances: How the Restatement of Torts Almost Negligently Killed the Right
to Exclude in Property Law, 121 W. VA. L. REV. 419 (2018).
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existing with the best of care.”397 Thus, if a wrongful condition exists, the
person responsible for its existence is liable for resulting damages to others.398 Nuisance, then, is predicated on harm—not an act or failure to act.399
Since negligence is not vital400 to establishing the claim, it becomes a suitable means of redress for sperm bank injuries, mooting the objection raised in
Donovan401 that the defendant’s negligence did not directly cause the injury.402
In recent years, nuisance claims for creating public health hazards have
proliferated (see chart below) on the basis that “the public enjoys a right to
be free from all sorts of non-physical harms.”403 Thus, in 1994, the attorney
general of Mississippi, knowing he couldn’t prove a traditional case against
the tobacco manufacturers, filed a public nuisance claim. 404 Dozens of states
followed,405 resulting in a $365.5 billion settlement.406 The theory was also
used successfully in a recent California lead paint case,407 when a California
court ordered three paint manufacturers to pay $1.1 billion for selling a hazardous product that created a public nuisance.408 It has also been used in
397. 58 AM. JUR. 2D, Nuisance §3; see infra note 336 and accompanying text.
398. State ex rel. Webster v. Daugherty, 530 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn. 1975) (enjoining the defendant in the future “from conducting, maintaining, or in any wise participating in: (a) the
operation of a house of ill fame, a bawdy house, or brothel . . . even though he had no
knowledge . . . of the past illegal acts.”).
399. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee, 691 N.W.2d 658, 669
(Wis. 2005).
400. Hale v. Jennings Bros. [1938] All ER 532 at 579 (Eng.).
401. Donovan v. Ident Labs., 625 F. Supp. 2d 259, 271 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
402. Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Berretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d
245, 264 (D.N.J. 2000) (“[P]ublic nuisance does not require a showing of proximate cause.”).
403. See Aldred’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 816; 9 Co. Rep. 57; Palmer, supra note 371
(“The complaint against odours from a piggery (in Aldred) and noxious fumes from sea-coal
combustion (in Jones) were, I suggest, at core concerned with threats to health - reminiscent
of public health issues - rather than injuries caused by negligent behaviour.”); see also John
E. Bryson & Angus Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241, 252 (1972).
404. See Barry Meier, Acting Alone, Mississippi Settles Suit With 4 Tobacco Companies,
N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/04/us/acting-alonemississippi-settles-suit-with-4-tobacco-companies.html.
405. E.g., State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429, (Miss. Ch. Ct. May 23, 1994).
406. The Rising Tide of Public Nuisance Claims, JONES DAY (Jan. 12, 2012),
https://www.lexology.com/contributors/jones-day; see also Georgia Nuisance Law Provides
Relief
For
Wronged
Landowners,
BUTLER,
WOOTEN
&
PEAK
LLP,
https://www.butlerwootenpeak.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf/nuisance-land-development.pdf
(last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
407. People v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 1-00-CV-788657 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.
Jan. 7, 2014).
408. But see Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Assoc., Inc., 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008); see also
In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007) (rejecting such claims); see Ohio, Dismissal
of Paint Lawsuit Confirms Such Litigation is Without Merit, Says Public Nuisance Fairness
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firearms and asbestos cases.409 What these cases have in common is a violation of a right enjoyed by the public—a right to public health and safety.
Chart 3: Public Nuisance Filings over The Last Four Decades.410

The most recent use of nuisance in a public health context is the opioid
litigation.411 In State of Ohio v. Purdue Pharma et al.,412 the Ohio attorney
general sought damages and equitable relief against a myriad of opioid
manufacturers413 for increased deaths, disability, and medical payments. The
reviewing magistrate held that public nuisance is an appropriate remedy
when the public health is at stake,414 referring to City of Cincinnati v.
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co.415 and noting that under Ohio law a common
law public nuisance is an “interference with a right common to the general
public, [such as] [a] right to public health . . . a right to public safety . . . and

Coalition, BUS. WIRE (July 09, 2008), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20080709006275/en/Columbus-Ohio-Dismissal-Paint-Lawsuit-Confirms-Litigation (A nonprofit group, The Public Nuisance Fairness Coalition, was formed to counter broadened uses
of public nuisance).
409. BLOOMBERG NEWS, supra note 367.
410. BLOOMBERG NEWS, supra note 367; see also Meier, supra note 404.
411. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1375 (U.S. Jud. Pan.
Mult. Lit. 2017); see Samuel Fresher, Opioid Addiction Litigation and the Wrongful Conduct
Rule, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 1311, 1311 (2018); but see James K. Holder, Opening the Door
Wider: Opioid Litigation and the Scope of Public Nuisance Law, IN-HOUSE DEF. Q. (Spring
2018), at 33 (noting that Orange and Santa Clara, California, Counties also filed opioid public
nuisance suits, which were dismissed).
412. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:18-OP-45604, 2018 WL 4019413 (N.D.
Ohio Aug. 23, 2018).
413. See West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. McKesson Corp., No. 16-cv-01772, 2017 WL
357307 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 24, 2016).
414. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 2018 WL 3895865.
415. 863 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 2017); see also Cleveland v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 2013 WL 1183332, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2013) (describing a public nuisance
claim as a common law tort action to vindicate interference with a general public right).
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a right to public comfort.”416 Such reasoning amply sustains its use in the
present context.
C.

Damages: Expanding the Scope

Because the anticipated claim does not revolve around the child’s birth
or life (wrongful or otherwise), but around the child’s present existence and
the right to enjoy it,417 the child conceived with IVF or sperm bank assistance should be able to bring his/her own claim in nuisance, otherwise denied under negligence’s wrongful life claim. In addition, the nuisance claim
allows a state’s public officials to sue on behalf of its citizens,418 thereby
interjecting some governmental oversight. In addition to broadening the
universe of eligible plaintiffs, the nuisance claim also broadens allowable
damages.419
1.

Discomfort, Unhappiness, and Mental Anguish

While physical, pecuniary, and occasionally significant emotional injury is required to institute a negligence claim, damages in nuisance are also
available for a broader array of emotional upsets, including inconvenience,
annoyance, or discomfort.420 To be sure, the emotional harms encountered in
negligence are not the sort that nuisance typically recognizes. However,
distinguishing between the two types of psychological harm is often a matter
of semantics.421 In addition, it must be noted, the strictures incident to the

416. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1375 (U.S. Jud. Pan.
Mult. Lit. 2017) (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 863 F.3d 474,
477 (6th Cir. 2017)).
417. Which parallels the requirements of a nuisance claim, the loss of present and future
enjoyment, and is a right enjoyed by all.
418. Russo, supra note 25, at 1973 (citing Laura King, Narrative, Nuisance, and Environmental Law, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 331, 331–32 (2014)).
419. NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
420. See Hodas, supra note 354, at 896.
421. See Kelly v. CB&I Constructors, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 43 (Cal Ct. App. 2009)
(“[A]nnoyance and discomfort damages are distinct from general damages for mental and
emotional distress. Annoyance and discomfort damages are intended to compensate a plaintiff for the loss of his or her peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the property. ‘We recognize that annoyance and discomfort by their very nature include a mental or emotional component, and that some dictionary deﬁnitions of these terms include the concept of distress.
Nevertheless, the “annoyance and discomfort” for which damages may be recovered on nuisance and trespass claims generally refers to distress arising out of physical discomfort, irritation, or inconvenience caused by odors, pests, noise, and the like. Our cases have permitted
recovery for annoyance and discomfort damages on nuisance and trespass claims while at the
same time precluding recovery for “pure” emotional distress.’”) (internal citations omitted).
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negligence type of emotional distress (such as requiring accompanying
physical injury) are either relaxed or entirely absent in the nuisance context.
Examining a smattering of cases allowing “softer” psychological damages is instructive. Going back to beginnings, we see allowable damages for
the discomfiture suffered from exposure to the “fetid and unwholesome”
stench emanating from a neighbor’s newly erected pig-sty.422 More recently,
in Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp,423 the Arizona Court of Appeals held the
plaintiffs had a valid public nuisance claim for inconvenience, discomfort,
and annoyance resulting from exposure to asbestos.424 Emotional distress,
which arises out of the inconvenience and discomfiture presented by the
nuisance, is, thus, compensable.425 In Hensley v. San Diego Gas & Electric
Co.,426 the court allowed the plaintiff to recover for his emotional distress as
a component of his discomfort and annoyance damages. Such damages included harm arising from stress, worry, the aggravation of Mr. Hensley’s
suffering as a result of Crohn’s disease, lost income, and medical expenses.427 In Miotke v. City of Spokane,428 the court allowed the plaintiffs to bring
a public nuisance claim and recover for nausea, headaches, nervousness, and
insomnia. Some statutes expand the notion further. A Georgia statute, for
example, provides that “[a] prevailing plaintiff is entitled to damages for
‘discomfort, loss of peace of mind, unhappiness and annoyance.’”429
The Allison case430 highlights the strong instinct to safeguard our wellbeing holistically as it extends personal injury to mental well-being.431 Under this reasoning, even the “yuck” factor attributable to increased risk of
incest should be compensable—the mere concern causing mental anguish
being the actionable harm. This might be analogous to the cases of Thomp-

422. Aldred’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 816; 9 Co. Rep. 57; see also Baker [1975] CLY
2450, at 118; see Palmer, supra note 371.
423. Burns v. Jaquays Min. Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
424. See Keating, supra note 24.
425. Webster v. Boone, 992 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Colo. App. 1999). See also Institoris v.
City of L.A., 210 Cal. App. 3d 10, 21 (1989) (holding that emotional damages can be recovered in an action for private nuisance, but it must be caused by an interference with a specific
property right).
426. Hensley v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 806 (Cal. Ct. App.
2017).
427. Johnny J. Yeh, California Appellate Court Clarifies Availability of Emotional Distress Damages in Nuisance Cases, EMERGENT (May 4, 2017), http://emergent.law/blog/
2017/5/4/hensley-damages-nuisance-cases.
428. Miotke v. City of Spokane, 678 P.2d 803, 810 (Wash. 1984).
429. GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-1 (Georgia statutes also provide that, “[n]ominal damages are
also recoverable in nuisance cases. A recovery of nominal damages may be sufficient to
support an award of attorney fees and punitive damages.”).
430. See Allison v. Merton, Sutton & Wandsworth AHA [1975] CL 2450 (Eng.).
431. Palmer, supra note 371, at 118.
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son-Schwab v. Costak 432 and Laws v. Florinplace Ltd.,433 where proximity
of a brothel and a sex shop (respectively) caused mental upset, and the mere
presence of those premises was deemed to be actionable.434
Finally, if the injury is severe enough and appropriate, in addition to
monetary damages, nuisance claims also allow plaintiffs to seek equitable
relief.435 And the fear of being shut down may well motivate sperm banks to
upgrade their practices.
2.

Increased Risks and Fear Thereof

As one commentator noted, “it is important to understand [that] the
judges’ interpretation of nuisance doctrine at the birth of modern nuisance
law . . . [is] on the grounds essentially of a risk to health.”436 In other words,
the threat or risk of disease brings along with it a fear of disease. Claims
where there was a mere fear of infection were recognized early on.437 But,
the question becomes, is this fear a type of emotional harm that is compensable under nuisance law? Does it arise out of the act itself, or is it a byproduct? Since in the situation addressed here, the fear is associated with
possessing a defective gene and knowing one may have a genetic (and heritable) defect, I argue the distress arises out of the implantation of the defective sperm itself. Moreover, watching such a child grow up should also allow the mother’s recovery under the ambit of the zone of danger rule espoused under negligence theory. Both forms, then, should sustain a claim
for the fear of the risk of developing disease, one under nuisance theory, one
under negligence law.
But is the increased risk, itself, compensable?

432. Thomas-Schwab v. Costaki [1956] All ER 652; WLR 335 (Eng.) (where the sight of
prostitutes entering and leaving the defendant’s premises was so offensive as to be actionable
in nuisance by a neighboring owner).
433. Laws v. FlorinPlace Ltd. [1981] All ER 659 (Eng.).
434. See Palmer, supra note 371 at 120; see also Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d
287, 291 (N.J. 1987).
435. Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Haw. 1982); see also Hodas, supra
note 354, at 886.
436. Palmer, supra note 371 at 122 (discussing Aldred’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 816,
820–821; 9 Co. Rep. 57, 77) (emphasis in original); see also Baker [1975] CLY 2450 at 118
(Eng.).
437. See e.g., Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 481 (Conn. 1990) (enabling recovery
for fear-based distress after a negligently performed surgical procedure leading to an 8–16
percent risk of bowel obstruction); see also Debbie E. Lanin, The Fear of Disease as a Compensable Injury: An Analysis of Claims Based on AIDS Phobia, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 77, 77
(1993).
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Birth defects occur in approximately 3 percent of live-born babies.438
Some have genetic causes, others are environmentally triggered, and still
others require both a genetic and environmental component. In most cases,
there is no way to predict which individuals will be subjected to the random
risk of being born with a genetic anomaly.439 However, we can predict the
percent of people in a population who will succumb to a given disease with
a reasonable degree of certainty.440 A child who is part of an at-risk population surely will entertain a worry that he or she will be among the afflicted,
and, as stated above, should be compensated.
The Xytex Saga, then, is not at all akin to Becker v. Schwartz,441 which
rejects the child’s wrongful life claim442 because no child has a right to be
born free from disease.443 The Aggeles children face different risks than the
Becker child, who succumbed to normal risk of disease. Here, we have children who, by virtue of the malfeasance of the defendant have an increased
risk of disease—at somewhere between six-to-twenty-fold over background.
Further, while parents are required to accept some minimal risk (i.e., 3 percent) of a child born with birth defects, saddling on them the burden of increased costs incident thereto—after enriching the coffers of the errant
sperm bank—is plainly unjust. Nevertheless, increased-risk claims have
generally been rejected444 and hence without more there is little reason to
believe they would be honored in the IVF or sperm bank context. 445 But
there is more.
Evolutionary biology suggests the population gene pool can accommodate a birth defect level of 3 percent. On these expected (“normal”) risks,
438. Birth Defects: Data & Statistics on Birth Defects, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/birthdefects/data.html.
439. See ALEXANDER, supra note 287.
440. Id.
441. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978).
442. The philosopher Prof. David Heyd brilliantly castigates the dicta in Becker (wrongfully echoed in Donovan v. Idant Labs, 625 F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D. Pa. 2009)), which sidesteps the wrongful life issue on the grounds that “[w]hether it is better never to have been
born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to
be left to the philosophers and the theologians . . .” ostensibly because judges think they
“possess a privileged access to this kind of knowledge.” Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812; David
Heyd, Are “Wrongful Life” Claims Philosophically Valid? A Critical Analysis of a Recent
Court Decision, 21 ISR. L. REV. 574, 583 (1986). Heyd claims “that there is really nothing to
know here, even for philosophers.” Id. (citing Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (1979)).
443. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812.
444. See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 158, at 817, 818 nn. 9–10, 819, 822.
445. Two cases where increased risk claims were accepted are Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) and Gideon v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985), although in the first present injury was found along with a more likely than not opinion that the plaintiff would go on
to develop cancer.
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health policy, actuarial data, and insurance quotes are predicated. But the
word “risk” here is inapt. While the individual may be at an increased risk of
disease, the population is faced with a certainty that there will be several
times more children born with inherited diseases. In other words, the damage caused by infiltration of the gene pool is not a one-off shot. Society will
bear burdens of this damage over successive generations, and hence is
harmed now and in the future. As society’s representative, Mr. Aggeles’
children should be allowed to sue for the certainty of increased disease in
the population.
3.

Medical Monitoring

Threat or risk of harm—and fear of its development—brings a desire
for prevention. And here we face the question whether medical monitoring
or other prophylactic measures should be compensable.
In Allison v. Merton, Sutton and Wandsworth Area Health Authority,446
the plaintiff’s sleep was affected by the incessant noise and vibrations from
the defendant’s boilers to such a degree that she developed depression. She
sought an injunction and was successful on the grounds of preserving her
mental health.447 Injunction is a future-oriented remedy and can be considered a prophylactic measure. Here we see damages allowed on preventative
grounds. More recently, the Burns court448 also allowed claims for medical
monitoring on preventative grounds. Although none of the plaintiffs had
been diagnosed with asbestos-related diseases, the court ordered the defendant to pay for monitoring, holding that monitoring was necessary to track the
potential development of cancer and other asbestos-related diseases.
In Mr. Aggeles’ case, we don’t know if his condition was geneticallymediated (which could occur either due to mutation or because he inherited
the gene).449 Testing could prove inconclusive. But the costs (and severity)
of the disease—should it arise in his offspring—can be mitigated via monitoring and early intervention,450 reducing the risk of severe psychosis.451 In
446. See Allison v. Merton, Sutton & Wandsworth AHA [1975] C.L. 2450 (Eng.); see
also JOHN FINCH SPELLER, LAW RELATING TO HOSPITALS 329 (Springer ed., 2010).
447. Id.; see also Palmer, supra note 371, at 97 n.342.
448. See Burns v. Jaquays Min. Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 33, 156 Ariz. 375, 380, (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1988) (“[D]espite the absence of physical manifestations of any asbestos-related diseases . . . the plaintiffs should be entitled [to recover the costs of medical monitoring].”).
449. See MUKHERJEE, supra note 246, at 446. (“Familial schizophrenia [as opposed to
genetic mutations, which are also inherited] . . . is highly heritable.”).
450. In 2008, NIMH launched the Recovery After an Initial Schizophrenia Episode
(RAISE) project for this purpose. See Max Marshall & John Rathbone, Early Intervention for
Psychosis, 6 COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REV. 1 (2011).
451. NAT’L COLLABORATING CTR. MENTAL HEALTH, PSYCHOSIS AND SCHIZOPHRENIA IN
ADULTS: TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 102 (2014).
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fact, the National Institute for Health Care and Excellence recommends that
a person with “a first-degree relative with psychosis or schizophrenia
[should be referred] for assessment without delay . . . in an early intervention in psychosis service.”452 Another preventative measure is avoiding
drugs associated with development of the disorder, such as cannabis, cocaine and amphetamines.453 Thus, where a child at risk has an attention deficit disorder, screening might alert physicians not to prescribe otherwise indicated drugs such as amphetamines. In fact, medical monitoring is recognized454 in the toxic tort arena455 on public health grounds.456 “To date, courts
in about twenty jurisdictions recognize these claims.”457 As the court in
Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp458 noted:
[T]here is an important public health interest in fostering access to medical testing for individuals whose exposure to toxic chemicals creates an
enhanced risk of disease . . . Medical monitoring is appropriate where it
can be proven that such expenses are necessary and reasonably certain to
be incurred . . . . We now reject the contention that a claim for future
medical expenses must rest upon the existence of present physical harm.
The injury that underlies a claim for medical monitoring—just as with
any other cause of action sounding in tort—is the invasion of any legally
protected interest.
452. Id. (emphasis added).
453. Marco M. Picchioni & Robin M. Murray, Schizophrenia, 335 BRIT. MED. J. 91, 92
(2007).
454. Andrew R. Klein, Rethinking Medical Monitoring, 64 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 15
(1998) (“[E]nhanced risk itself is not compensable, but if you demonstrate an increased risk
of disease, you can recover medical monitoring costs . . . .”).
455. See, e.g., Betts v. Manville Pers. Injury Settlement Tr., 588 N.E.2d 1193, 1218 (Ill.
App. 1992) (“Here, the incurring of medical expenses for future monitoring of plaintiffs’
conditions is reasonably certain to occur, although the contracting of cancer is not.”); Hagerty
v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 316 (5th Cir. 1986); Friends For All Children,
Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Paoli R. R. Yard
PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3rd Cir. 1990); Ayers v. Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 314 (N.J.
1987).
456. Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 1999) (outlining
public policy considerations that favor medical monitoring: “especially in light of the value
of early diagnosis and treatment for insidious diseases such as cancer . . . . recognizing these
claims promotes deterrence by discouraging the irresponsible distribution of toxic substances
. . . . [E]arly monitoring may prevent or mitigate future illnesses and thus reduce the eventual
liability costs to the defendants; and . . . allowing recovery serves ‘“societal notions of fairness and elemental justice’” by assuring that plaintiffs ‘“wrongfully exposed to dangerous
toxins,’” but unable to prove that cancer or other disease is likely, may recover when medical
surveillance is shown to be reasonable and necessary.”); see Twerski & Henderson, supra
note 158, at 843.
457. But see Twerski & Henderson, supra note 158, at 823–25 (criticizing the state of
affairs in asbestos litigation).
458. Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 431 (W. Va. 1999) (internal citations omitted) (citing Potter
Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993)).
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By comparison, redressing public health concerns (including medical monitoring) is ignored in the Xytex cases.459
VI. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY: VIOLATING THE PUBLIC TRUST AND THE
NATURAL ORDER
In this part, I argue that sperm banks should be held to a fiduciary
standard as they have usurped the right to parent—which I claim includes
selection of the co-parent. Thus, when the sperm bank erroneously substitutes a different genetic package than selected by the consumer, the sperm
bank effectively replaces the biological parent of choice and frustrates the
right to co-parental selection (defining biological parent as contributor of
one-half the child’s genetic package). This part also contains a brief discussion on the concern about eugenics in this context.
A.

Interference with Evolutionary Behavior and the Right to Parent
1.

The Dating and Mating Dance

Except in cases of rape, in “real-life” (i.e., before technology overtook
things), a woman either knew who the father of her children would be because she had met him460 or because her parents had selected him, with her,
or at least the family’s best interests at heart.461 In cultures which approve of
arranged marriages, the lineage of the prospective mate is carefully vetted
by the bride and groom’s parents to assure no taint of family history of disease. In ancient cultures, the process of the courtship ritual was so intricately
choreographed that various qualities of the prospective suitor were displayed. In addition to apparent physical virtues, the courtship ritual enabled
a woman to assess the suitor’s intelligence, breeding, education, culture, and
financial condition.462
This process of intentional selection is designed (and has evolved) to
select the “best” candidate for preservation of the gene pool. A “right to

459. See Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 440 (Nev. 2001) (“Courts have recognized medical monitoring more often as a remedy than as a cause of action.”); see also Victor
E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring—Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1057, 1074 (1999).
460. “It used to be so simple. Girl meets boy. Gametes were transferred through plumbing
optimized by millions of years of evolution.” Sex and Science, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2017, at
7, 7.
461. Perhaps this is a reason rape is an acceptable exception in jurisdictions where abortion is otherwise prohibited.
462. See, e.g., Lady Muraski, The Ghost of Courtship Past, ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 2018, at
68, 68.
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parent” has been recognized463 and it can be argued that that right includes
the right to select the co-parent. Pre-selection vetting, including getting a
“sense” of the potential mate, is part of the process. This “right” is relinquished when anonymity is the rule and reliance is placed on the intermediary—a sperm bank—to vet the candidate and assure his sperm’s suitability
for fertilization. By confounding the mother’s right to choose the biological
partner of her child, I claim that the sperm bank has violated her right to
parent to her detriment, the child’s detriment, and the detriment of the public.
Thus, had Ms. Collins or Ms. Doe or Ms. Zelt or Ms. Norman or any of
the other mothers been allowed to meet Mr. Aggeles prior to the impregnation, something that cannot be objectively described, a warning sense that
something was amiss might have prevented them from agreeing to accept
his sperm, no matter how good-looking he was on paper. This je ne sais
quoi factor is the essence and what-for of the dating and mating ritual
known as courtship. This opportunity is forfeited when anonymous sperm
suppliers provide the genetic material. It also inures to the commercial benefit of the sperm bank. (Interestingly, the deprivation of the opportunity to vet
the male’s gametogenic contribution is often not paralleled when ova are
selected. And in the case of selection of a gestational surrogate, the biological parent(s) have a robust opportunity to vet the surrogate).
Truth be told, under “natural” circumstances, women don’t always
make the best choices to father their children. Nor even in the artfully arranged dance of courtship are intentions always met. Sometimes even there
the patency of the process is occluded: witness Cyrano de Bergerac. Nevertheless, under normal circumstances, the number of offspring of the pair is
limited, and hence so is any potential population threat. Furthermore, one
surmises that potential fathers with serious personality disorders are less
likely to enter lasting relationships that “bear fruit” compared to “neurotypicals.” 464 Even if such a person had a relationship for the purposes of babymaking, the likelihood that any one individual (normal or otherwise) would
father thirty-six children in the conventional family setting is highly remote.465 Thus, the sperm bank’s wrongful insinuation in the process of “par463. Goodwin, supra note 18, at 1088.
464. It is to be noted that John Nash, Jr., the Nobel Prize winner in economics, was a
diagnosed schizophrenic. He had two children, one of whom has schizophrenia. Dr. Nash’s
schizophrenic son also has a Ph.D. in math; however, he does not seem to be employed and
seems to need constant oversight or care. See DISCOVERY CHANNEL, Beautiful Minds: Interview with John Nash and Son, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SizS1nOOeJg (last visited
Oct. 20, 2019).
465. The Guinness record for number of children sired by a man in a family relationship
(with multiple wives) was eighty-seven—and even that is an order of magnitude less than the
most prolific sperm donors. Most Prolific Mother Ever, GUINNESS WORLD REC.,
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ent selection” and frustration of that right, should be an additional predicate
upon which to saddle sperm banks with liability.
2.

The Sperm Bank as a Fiduciary

The active involvement of sperm banks in advertising and marketing
specific sperm “products,” as was done in the Xytex case (i.e., puffing up
qualifications and the like), smells of some paternalistic practice wrought on
a vulnerable population. One would hope that entering into any medicallyoriented relationship confers on the provider a heightened sense of responsibility—something akin to a fiduciary status. Traditionally, a fiduciary relationship exists when one person, often in a position of vulnerability, vests
confidence, reliance, and trust in another whose aid, advice, or protection is
sought in some matter.466 In such a relationship, good conscience requires
the fiduciary to act at all times for the sole benefit and interest of the one
who trusts.467 Shouldn’t this description apply to the sperm bank?
Thus, when a prospective mother relegates the biological choice of coparent not to her parents, but to a third party who is reaping a profit for their
activities, she similarly expects great care will be taken to ensure that the
child is not born with an avoidable problem. Should this not be a right? I
therefore argue that consigning this right of vetting to the sperm bank ought
to confer on the intermediary some sort of fiduciary status, not only to protect the woman (and her child’s) interests, but also to preserve and protect
the population gene pool.
Whether the sperm bank wants to insulate itself in a legal matrix, society cannot blind itself to the special relationship that arises by virtue of selling and buying reproductive materials. One would hope that the quid pro
quo for commodification of genetic material (padding the pockets and purses of sperm bank operators) would be in exchange for some heightened fiduciary-like responsibility. Alas, the courts, in some misguided fashion,468
confer on them a misguided immunity under the guise of barring suits for
wrongful life/birth.
https://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/most-prolific-mother-ever (last visited
Jun. 19, 2018).
466. Breach of Fiduciary Duty, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM
§ 20 TD, Westlaw (database updated October 2019) (factors generally militating toward a
finding of a fiduciary relationship “generally consist of trust and reliance on the fiduciary by
another, and often a degree of control by the fiduciary over the other party's person, property,
or affairs”).
467. Hospital Products Ltd. V. United States Surgical Co. (1984) 156 CLR 41 (Austl.);
see also Breen v. Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 (Austl.) (referencing medical records access).
468. See generally Karla FC Holloway, Private Bodies, Public Text: Race, Gender, and a
Cultural Bioethics, DUKE U. PRESS (2011) 27–66 (referencing the antecedents of reproductive
protectionism and paternalism in American legal history).
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The protected status enjoyed by the bloated sperm bank industry should
be contrasted with defendant-manufacturers in toxic-tort cases. The travesty
of this disparity becomes apparent when comparing the two situations.
Chemically-related harms are accommodated—even when injury has not yet
manifested—by allowing medical monitoring in toxic tort cases.469 In the
IVF/sperm bank context, we have an increased risk of being born with a
genetic anomaly akin to increased risk of cancer in toxic torts, except instead of the increased risk caused by a manufacturer with whom the plaintiff
has no direct relationship, the harm is caused by an entity—the sperm
bank—which has a direct, and I argue, fiduciary-like, relationship470 with the
child’s mother. But by virtue of legal mumbo-jumbo, i.e., couching the cases as arising out of wrongful birth/life rather than focusing on the resultant
harm (or alternatively the defendant’s malfeasance), the courts cocoon the
sperm bank defendant from liability.
B.

A Word About Eugenics

The issue of genetic tampering raises hackles and concern about eugenics,471 as has happened when sperm banks screen sperm or IVF facilities
employ preimplantation genetic diagnostics.472 Whether persons have the
right to interfere with natural genetic selection is precisely the issue. According to bio-ethicist Professor Jonathan Glover, only when the State interferes with genetic selection as a matter of policy does the eugenics issue
arise.473 Further, the opportunity to select the genetic contribution for our
child from the opposite sex is precisely the reason for the “dating and mating” ritual discussed above. How different is selecting traits in an offspring
via choice of a gamete different from choice of a mate who manifests these
genes in the flesh? Here, I argue that when third parties (e.g., sperm banks)
insinuate themselves into the genetic selection process—and reap a profit
along the way—the law must be made to have some solutions for ensuing
problems. A full discussion of the matter, though, remains for further discussion.474
469. See supra text accompanying note 452.
470. See CAHN, supra note 2, at 21–24; see also Mothew v. Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y
[1996] EWCA (Civ) 533 (Eng.).
471. See DAAR, supra note 48.
472. See BBC NEWS, supra note 31.
473. Jonathan Glover, Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, and Design, OXFORD U.
PRESS (2006).
474. Other related issues abound. These include cases where deaf parents wanted their
children to bear a gene for deafness, so their children should be like them. Because the transfer is intentional, it is unclear whether it is wrongful, unethical, or neither. See Kristen Rabe
Smokensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation
Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 309 (2008); see also Sofia Yakren, “Wrongful
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VII. CONCLUSION
This article examines the most serious sperm bank generated harms,
focusing on causing children with heritable defects to be born.475 I demonstrate here for the first time that these harms transcend merely violating the
personal goals of the parent and rights of the child. Rather, the greater harms
I delineate also damage society by saddling it with additional health costs
(and legal costs in the case of switched embryos) and impairs the population
gene pool.
I also identify sperm bank practices which foster such harms, including
anonymity of sperm suppliers. This practice compounds the problem by
encouraging less than candid responses on screening questionnaires. Together with uneven regulation and lax enforcement which invites sperm
suppliers to father hundreds of children, these practices set the stage for
multiple children with heritable genetic errors to be born. Lack of adequate
screening—the last clear chance to prevent transmission of heritable diseases—brings the problem to the clear and present danger level. These practices are ripe for regulation. However, such a solution will not be quick in
coming.
Until enforceable regulations are available globally, sperm banks must
be held accountable for the harms that result, even if non-negligent—both to
protect the public and redress individuals. This article introduces the novel
concept of incorporating claims for private use of public nuisance theory to
accomplish this end. I suggest here that when sperm banks implant gametes
and embryos with genetic anomalies, they violate the right to parent (which
I argue includes the right to choose a biological parental partner or his
genes) and breach the duty not to impair the public health. Even when the
mishap occurs from non-negligent practices, nuisance law dictates the harm
must be redressed. Thus, where the parent has been deprived of the opportunity to vet the donor and is induced to rely on the sperm bank’s representations, that parent should be compensated for harms that ensue. Certainly,
the genetically impaired child is injured—knowing his or her genetic
makeup includes a time bomb putting her/him at a greater risk than children
born in the ordinary course of events—and should be compensated as well.
Nuisance theory, a harm-driven approach, broadens the class of plaintiffs
eligible to sue to include parent, child, and even public official; expands the
available damages to cover medical monitoring, fear, and other soft harms;
and allows for punitive damages which can act as a deterrent.
Birth” Claims and the Paradox of Parenting a Child with a Disability, 97 FORDHAM L. REV.
583 (2018).
475. Is this different than causing children to be born with heritable defects for which
there is a remedy? Tangentially, another serious harm is switched embryos which generates
custody disputes.
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Finally, I advocate a holistic approach,476 utilizing three legal modalities functioning in tandem: regulation, tort claims, and multiple enforcement
mechanisms. Tort-based claims provide a more rapid means and higher level
of recompense than regulation alone, thereby motivating sperm banks to
self-regulate. I suggest that once the sperm bank industry realizes it can no
longer bury their mistakes by settlement of dubious negligence claims, 477 it
will institute more sensitive quality control and assurance procedures that
will mitigate the lesser harms as well.

476. See generally MORTIMER & MORTIMER, supra note 57 (recommending processes of
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